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SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND ESTATE: ON
EXCLUDING PARISH ASSETS FROM THE
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF A DIOCESE
ORGANIZED AS A CORPORATION SOLE
By Daniel J. Marcinak'
At the closing of St. Bridget's Catholic Church on Chicago's Southwest
Side in July 1990, one man confessed, "'When St. Bridget goes, a little of
me is going, too."' The pastor of St. Bridget's, the church where
Chicago's late Mayor Richard J. Daley wed in 1936, said, "'I feel like I'm
presiding over a huge family wake."' 2 In the early 1990s, the pastor of St.
Paul's in Noe Valley, California, concurred when he acknowledged,
"'The church is not just a building. It's an institution, a community-a
family, really. So this is like a death. And if a parish dies-for whatever
reason-it's demoralizing. It just zaps your energy."' 3 Mary Giorgio,
ninety-one years old and a parishioner of St. Susanna's in Dedham,
Massachusetts for forty-three years, was among that church's first
parishioners. St. Susanna's hosted weekly dances, weddings, memorial
Masses, and the funeral of Mary's late husband, Salvatore.5 Mary
described her bond to the parish as "'just part of me"' and "'a feeling of
being complete .... I get up in the morning, knowing I am going to St.
Susanna's to start the day off right."' 6 Upon hearing that St. Susanna's
would close, Mary recalls thinking "'please God, if my time is coming,
make it happen before the parish closes . . . . I can have a Catholic
funeral in any church. But I cannot conceive of myself having the last
rites and leaving this world from another parish."'7 The communities of
St. Bridget's, St. Paul's, and St. Susanna's surely did not welcome these
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1. Isabel Wilkerson, Catholic Parish Closings Bring Tears in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 1990, at A10.
2. Id.
3. Don Lattin, 13 Catholic Parishes to Close, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15, 1993, at Al.
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closings, but a decline in parish enrollment in the 1980s and 1990s
presented financial difficulties that made closures inevitable.8
Not nearly as inevitable are parish closings that may result from the
sex-abuse scandal that has buffeted the American Roman Catholic
Church (Church). 9 That scandal unfolded when the Boston Globe
reported in 2002 that the Boston Archdiocese knowingly transferred at
least one abusive priest among several parishes over several years.0 This
revelation spurred sex-abuse allegations against Church clergy
throughout the country." Between 1950 and mid-June 2005, sexual
abuse claims had cost the Church in America $1.06 billion. 2 Some
8. See Lattin, supra note 3; Mehren, supra note 4; Wilkerson, supra note 1.
9. Cf Dene Moore, Abuse Suit Forces Sale of Churches, TORONTO STAR, May 10,
2005, at Al, 2005 WLNR 7324768 (describing parish closings in Newfoundland, Canada).
After sixteen years of litigation over sex-abuse claims, the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld rulings by lower courts against the Catholic Diocese of St. George's in
Newfoundland. Id. To satisfy the judgment for $13 million, "[a]ll of the churches, all of
the parish houses, all the missions," approximately 150 properties, will be sold. Id.
10. See Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON
SUNDAY GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at Al. However, the genesis of parish closings in and
around Boston actually antedate the scandal. See Kathy McCabe, As Parishes Close,
Survivors Plot Future, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1998, at 4 North (discussing in
1998 Archdiocesan plans to close several dozen parishes through "2008 because of
declining attendance and shrinking numbers of clergy").
11. See Laurie Goodstein, Boston Priests' Sex-Abuse Scandal Has Ripple Effect;
Other Names Are Released, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at A27. Of course, guilt does not
fall on all priests or all bishops in the United States: incidents of sexual child abuse
implicated four percent of Catholic priests in America from 1950 to 2002 (4392 of
109,694). JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE
PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 6, http://www.usccb.org/nrb/johnjaystudy/exec.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,
2005). In dioceses confronting charges of sexual abuse, it is fair to note that some of the
bishops dealing with the fallout have often been handed these charges from their
predecessors: Archbishop Sefn O'Malley of Boston (appointed in 2003), The Most
Reverend Sein Patrick O'Malley, OFM Cap, Archbishop of Boston, http://www.
rcab.org/People/cardinalOMalley.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005); Archbishop Timothy
Dolan of Milwaukee (appointed in 2002), The Most Reverend Timothy M. Dolan;
Archbishop of Milwaukee, http://www.archmil.org/bishops/ArchbishopDolan.asp (last
visited Sept. 30, 2005); Bishop Gerald Kicanas of Tucson (appointed in 2001), Most
Reverend Gerald F. Kicanas, Sixth Bishop of Tucson, http://www.diocesetucson.org/
bishop2.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005); and Bishop John Vlazny of Portland, Oregon
(appointed in 1997), Archbishop John G. Vlazny, http://www.archdpdx.org/abvlazny/
abvlazny.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). For a question-and-answer presentation on the
sex-abuse scandal, see Catholic Answers Staff, Q&A: Understanding the Priest Scandal,
THIS ROCK, Nov. 2002, http:/lwww.catholic.comlthisrockl200O2l211fea2.asp.
12. See Rachel Zoll, Sex Abuse-Related Costs Top $1 Billion, MIAMI HERALD, June
10, 2005, at Al, 2005 WLNR 9200385. Between 2002 and mid-2005, the Church spent at
least $378 million defending against sex-abuse claims. See id.
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Church dioceses managed to settle their claims. 3 The Archdiocese of
Boston was the first diocese to consider bankruptcy protection,' 4 but the
Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon was the first diocese to file for
bankruptcy protection on July 6, 2004." The Diocese of Tucson16 and the
Diocese of Spokane 7 soon followed, and more are expected. 8 Because
no American diocese had ever filed for bankruptcy protection, this area
of the law involves "'totally uncharted waters.'" 9
The uncertainty arises when determining whether a diocese, organized
under state law as a corporation sole where a bishop holds legal title to
all parish property, is required under bankruptcy law to include parish
assets in the diocese's bankruptcy estate in violation of Church law.20
13. See, e.g., Kelly St. John, San Francisco Archdiocese to Pay $16 Million, S.F.
CHRON., July 10, 2005, at A21, 2005 WLNR 10801737 (reporting that the Archdiocese of
San Francisco settled one dozen lawsuits); Bruce Schreiner, Diocese OKs $120 Million
Fund for Abuse Victims, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), June 4, 2005, at A5, 2005
WLNR 8960442 (reporting that the Diocese of Covington, Kentucky settled with more
than one hundred alleged victims for $120 million in what has become the largest
settlement of sex-abuse claims); William Lobdell & Jean Guccione, Diocese's Deal Raises
the Bar Across the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at Al tbl. (listing twenty settlements
between 2002 and 2004).
14. See Stephen Kurkjian & Michael Rezendes, Bankruptcy Filing Called Option for
Archdiocese, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding
Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV., 1181, 1181-83 (2003) (exploring the implications of
bankruptcy for the Boston Archdiocese).
15. See Laurie Goodstein, Oregon Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A12. Filing for bankruptcy under Title 11 of the United States
Code (Chapter 11) makes it less likely that creditors can seize parish assets such as
churches and schools. See Skeel, supra note 14, at 1188. As long as a nonprofit
organization, such as a diocese, remains in bankruptcy under Chapter 11, a bankruptcy
court cannot order the liquidation of its assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000) (protecting
nonprofit organizations from forced liquidation of assets); Skeel, supra note 14, at 1189.
16. See Michael Clancy, Diocese Files for Bankruptcy, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 21,
2004, at Al. On September 20, 2005, Tucson became the first diocese to emerge from
bankruptcy litigation. See Arthur H. Rotstein, Diocese Officially Free from Bankruptcy,
TUCSON CITIZEN (Ariz.), Sept. 21, 2005, at 4A (remarking that the dioceses of Portland
and Spokane "remain mired in litigation and far from resolution of their cases"). As part
of Tucson's reorganization plan and settlement agreement, more than $22 million will be
made available to claimants. Id.
17. See Janet I. Tu, Spokane Diocese Files Bankruptcy, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004,
at B1.
18. See Zoll, supra note 12. Some scholars have offered advice to dioceses as they
weigh their legal options. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 14, at 1183 (suggesting possible
scenarios and hypothetical situations a bankrupt diocese might face); see also Raymond C.
O'Brien, Clergy, Sex and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. REV., 363, 365-67 (2004)
(cautioning the Church not to use canon law as an obstacle to transparency).
19. Eli Sanders, Catholics Puzzle over a Bankruptcy Filing, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2004,
at A17 (quoting Bud Bunce, communications director for the Archdiocese of Portland).
20. See infra Part II.A. Key to Tucson's emergence from bankruptcy has been the
plaintiffs' willingness not to litigate this issue. Cf. Steve Woodward, Background Check,
2006]
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Resolution of this quandary is far reaching because more than one-half
of the 195 dioceses of the Church in the United States are corporations
sole."' In reality, however, the corporation sole structure does not
22approximate the Church's own organization. Whenever a bishop has
mere legal title to parish assets, he "owns" those assets for the benefit of
the parishes in his diocese; consequently, a diocese legally holds parish
properties in trust for parishes.2 1 Victims in the sex-abuse scandal who
have sued dioceses eye these parish assets because their inclusion
OREGONIAN, July 12, 2005, at A6. Recognizing that litigation of this issue could have
continued for years and "'completely eviscerated"' the value of a settlement, the
bankruptcy judge in Tucson concluded that he "'had no factual evidence that the creditors
would be better off through litigation."' Arthur H. Rotstein, Bankruptcy Judge OKs
Tucson Diocese Plan to Reorganize, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 12, 2005. He also posed a
rhetorical challenge: "'What's a used church worth? . . . Who would want to buy it?"'
Sheryl Kornman, Diocese to Pay $10M Upfront as Plan OK'd, TUCSON CITIZEN (ARIZ.),
July 12, 2005, at IA, 2005 WLNR 10963613.
21. See Francis Cardinal George, The Cardinal I Never Knew: George Mundelein,
CATHOLIC NEW WORLD (Chi.), Mar. 5, 2000, http://www.catholicnewworld.com/archive/
cardarch/card2000/030500.geo.html (commenting on a recent biography of the late
Cardinal Mundelein entitled Corporation Sole and how widespread that form of
incorporation is in the United States); see also DEP'T OF COMMC'NS, U.S. CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CATHOLIC INFORMATION PROJECT 5 (2003), available at
http://www.usccb.org/comm/cipfinal.pdf (describing the Church's presence in all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and for U.S. military personnel).
22. See Affidavit of William S. Skylstad at 14, Committee of Tort Litigants v. Catholic
Bishop of Spokane (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane), Case No. 04-08822-PCW-11,
Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. May 27, 2005). The Bishop of Spokane
explains:
It is important to note that the Roman Catholic Church does not understand
its structures in terms of a corporation, but rather in terms of a government.
Though we have a unique corporate form for civil purposes, the corporation sole,
we are structured more in lines with a government in order to fulfill the mission
of Jesus Christ through the three-fold ministries of sanctifying, teaching and
governing. This system of governance predates the civil law of the United States
by more than one thousand years and does not easily fit into its categories.
Id.
23. See Affidavit of William S. Skylstad, supra note 22, at 13, 26. Bishop Skylstad
clarifies:
The assets strictly defined as property of the juridic person of the diocese and
those assets belonging to the juridic persons of the parishes are not my assets and
not subject to my control in an unfettered manner. When a bishop acts as the
trustee, for example in the sale of parish property, he does not act as its owner.
The parish is the owner and receives the benefit of the sale.
Id. at 26. In its Statement of Financial Affairs included within its bankruptcy petition, the
Diocese of Spokane pleaded it "has no equitable beneficial or proprietary interest in
[relevant] property but, in some cases, holds mere legal title. In addition, certain of the
property is subject to a restriction imposed by the donor or grantor." Statement of
Financial Affairs at question 14, In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane, Case No. 04-
08822-PCWll (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Filed July 6, 2004).
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deepens diocesan pockets.2 4 In Portland, plaintiffs dispute Archdiocesan
calculations of $10 million to $50 million in assets, contending that
diocesan assets, with parish assets included, total between $300 million
and $500 million.25 In Spokane, Bankruptcy Judge Patricia Williams has
already determined that parish properties-"churches, schools,
cemeteries and other parcels" -belong in the diocese's bankruptcy
estate.26  Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Perris ruled similarly for thePortland plaintiffs.27
24. See Ashbel S. Green, Records Detail Case Against Church, SUNDAY
OREGONIAN, July 11, 2004, at Al. Retribution also motivates victims. See Kevin
Leininger, Woman Seeks Restitution for Abuse, NEWS-SENTINEL (FORT WAYNE, IND.),
July 16, 2005, at Al, 2005 WLNR 11187156 (profiling a woman who revealed she would
not have sought financial compensation save for the fact that lawyers told her "'nothing
hurts [the diocese] but money"').
25. Green, supra note 24. The Archdiocese of Portland listed this amount in its
bankruptcy petition. Statement of Financial Affairs, supra note 23, at Information
Regarding the Debtor. Plaintiffs are suing the Archdiocese of Portland for $534 million.
See Court Weighs What Church Assets Are Vulnerable in Sex-Abuse Suits, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at B2. The Diocese of Spokane claims that without parish assets, its
estate is worth approximately $11 million plus about $15 million in insurance; including
parish property increases the estate to approximately $80 million. See Nicholas K.
Geranios, Spokane Diocese, Struggling for Money, Could Close Parishes, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 10, 2005, at B5, 2005 WLNR 10824800. Because the diocese must pay attorneys' fees
for itself and plaintiffs, Spokane was at one point "bleeding" more than $325,000 a month.
See id. Low cash reserves have now forced the diocese to stop paying legal fees, a
circumstance that prompted Bankruptcy Judge Patricia Williams to question "how many
churches are we going to have to sell just because we can't get to plan confirmation?" See
John Stucke, Diocese in Cash Crunch: Lawyers Last Paid Two Months Ago, Spokesman-
Rev. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 29, 2006, at IA, 2006 WLNR 5307101.
26. See Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 311, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005) (order
denying motion to dismiss); Shea v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane (In re The Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), No. 04-08822-PCW11, Chapter 11, Adv. No. A04-00291-PCW, 2005
Bankr. LEXIS 1605, at *2-3, *9-10 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005) (denying the
Diocese's motion to dismiss). The Diocese filed its appeal with the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington on September 6, 2005. See Janet I. Tu,
Spokane Diocese Appeals Court Ruling, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at B7. While
pursuing this appeal, the Diocese has proposed a settlement of $45.7 million with seventy-
five plaintiffs in addition to making several non-monetary concessions. Janet I. Tu,
Proposed Sex-Abuse Settlement More Than Just Money, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at
Al. Though it is unclear how the Diocese will raise this money, it is expected that
parishioners will "have to make a significant long-term sacrifice to make this settlement
work" with the "possibility that some parish properties will be sold." Id.
27. See Susan Palmer, Judge Rules Parishes Don't Own Property, THE REGISTER-
GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Dec. 31, 2005, at Al. The Archdiocese appealed to the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon in January. See Matt Miller, Portland
Diocese Plans Battle, DAILY DEAL (N.Y., N.Y.), Feb. 16, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
2668846.
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Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that the judiciary nary fails to decide a
political question in the United States. 28 The Archdiocese of Portland's
filing for bankruptcy protection launched an epic that eventually could
culminate in resolution by the United States Supreme Court.29 Between
the plaintiffs' bar and the Church are the victims of sexual abuse whose
interests vary; current plaintiffs who wish to maximize their own recovery
against a diocese have different interests from future claimants who may
find all diocesan assets expended to satisfy the claims of those who filed
suit earlier.3' The parties are in no position to relent: the plaintiffs stand
to collect millions of dollars through either their tort claims or federal
bankruptcy courts, and dioceses are striving to retain their focus on the
religious mission that cannot be accomplished without parish property.
Often there is an unwillingness to compromise, precipitating a
31constitutional battle that could reverberate for years to come.
28. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library, Harper & Row 1988) (1835).
29. See Matt Miller, Court Weighs in on Catholic Church's Financial Structure,
BROWARD DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, Sept. 7, 2005, at 8 ("In theory, the appeal could
move from district court to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme
Court."); see also Matt Miller, Real Estate Key For Portland Church, DAILY DEAL, Apr.
15, 2005, 2005 WLNR 5873667 (quoting an archdiocesan lawyer who said "'[t]he [Portland
bankruptcy] court's decision on the parish property issues will have far-reaching effect"')
(second alteration in original). Mitchell Garabedian, plaintiffs' attorney in Boston,
predicted: "'I think if the church doesn't get its way in the Bankruptcy Court, there will be
a lot of aggressive litigation ... ' Marie Beaudette, Churches Weigh Going Bankrupt To
Escape Suits, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), July 26, 2004, at 1. In Spokane, appealing the
bankruptcy court's decision to the United States Supreme Court could take more than
nine years. John Stucke & Virginia de Leon, Decision May Cost Diocese, SPOKESMAN-
REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Aug. 27, 2005, at Al, 2005 WLNR 13812622.
30. See Letter from Most Reverend John G. Vlazny to the parishioners of the
Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon (July 6, 2004), at http://www.archdpdx.org/bankruptcy/
bankruptcy-letter.html (describing the conflicting interests of current and future
plaintiffs). Archbishop Vlazny explained:
[Bankruptcy] is, in fact, the only way I can assure that other claimants can be
offered fair compensation....
... One plaintiff seeks more than $130 million in compensatory and punitive
damages, the other $25 million .... With 60 other claims pending, I cannot in
justice and prudence pay the demands of these two plaintiffs.
Id.; cf. Skeel, supra note 14, at 1197-98. One commentator notes:
One sometimes hears the argument that the Church needs to file for bankruptcy.
. so that it will have sufficient financial resources to help others who are in need
elsewhere. The Church's continued capacity for ministry is crucially important,
but the principal objective must be to minister to those who have been abused-
the victims.
Skeel, supra note 14, at 1197-98 (citation omitted).
31. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 19. Statements by plaintiffs' attorneys in Portland
and Tucson leave no doubt that they would be willing to litigate as far as they can. See id.;
Matt Miller, Tucson Diocese Details Prepack, DAILY DEAL (N.Y., N.Y.), Sept. 22, 2004,
[Vol. 55:583
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This Comment explores the limits on assets of a Church diocese
organized as a corporation sole that has filed for bankruptcy under Title
11 of the United States Code (Chapter 11). This Comment first describes
the corporation sole's existence in the United States, the Church canon
law that governs the relationship between a diocese and parishes, and the
necessary elements for creating a trust to exclude certain property from
the diocese's bankruptcy estate. Then, this Comment will explain the
bankruptcy procedures that define the bankruptcy estate under Chapter
11 and the limits of the bankruptcy estate when property is held in trust.
Next, this Comment discusses the effects under the First Amendment of
compelling a diocese to liquidate parish properties. This Comment
argues that a state's corporation sole statute both creates a statutory trust
and incorporates canon law. Federal law contemplates this arrangement,
and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids its
disregard. This Comment concludes that a court infringes upon a
diocese's free-exercise rights when the court applies a neutral law of
general applicability, in a discriminatory manner, to the determination of
a diocese's bankruptcy estate.
2004 WLNR 4656404 [hereinafter Miller, Tucson Diocese]. David Slader, lead attorney
for a group of plaintiffs in Portland, described the Portland Archdiocese's filing for
Chapter 11 protection as a "'fraud on the bankruptcy court."' Sanders, supra note 19.
Another attorney for a group of plaintiffs in Tucson, Lynne Cadigan, once described the
Tucson Diocese's filing under Chapter 11 as "'a sham,"' further claiming that "'[t]his turns
[the bankruptcy] into a phone company fraud-recovery scheme."' Miller, Tucson Diocese
(second alteration in original). Cadigan was planning to litigate the bankruptcy
",aggressively,"' id., but the settlement in Tucson has "'educated"' her about the Diocese
of Tucson's wish to use the bankruptcy route to seek an equitable solution. See Rotstein,
supra note 20. Despite some measure of reconciliation, the litigation has been
acrimonious. See Stephanie Innes, Court May Toss Some Abuse Claims, ARIZONA DAILY
STAR, June 28, 2005, at Bi, 2005 WLNR 10638427 (stating that one plaintiff's attorney
likened the Diocese of Tucson's bishop to cult leader Jim Jones); Reply Brief by Mr. Shea
and Brief in Opposition to Motion of Diocese for Summary Judgment at 13-15, Shear v.
Catholic Bishop of Spokane, (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane), Case No. 04-08822-
PCWI1, Adv. No. 04-00291-PCW (Bankr. E.D. Wash. June 10, 2005) (arguing that
nineteenth-century Popes had something in common with "bigotry," the "lunatic fringe,"
"prejudice," and "hate-mongers," and that explanations of certain papal pronouncements
were "metaphysical, theosophical, and/or theological niceties [which] were lost upon the
common patrons of taverns such as the proverbial Joe six pack"; apparently, the
declaration of papal infallibility was so alarming that it "created a situation" Ulysses S.
Grant could not ignore).
2006]
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I. GOVERNING THE CHURCH WITH CIVIL AND CANON LAW
A. The Use of the Corporation Sole Within the American Church
A corporation sole is "a continuous legal personality that is attributed
to successive holders of certain monarchical or ecclesiastical positions.,
32
Originating in England,33 the corporation sole first evolved to manage
ecclesiastical ownership of property.3 4 The corporation sole appeared in
the American colonies to serve the same function, 35 but hierarchical
administration was not very popular in the newly born republic.
6
America's first Catholic bishop, John Carroll of Baltimore, eschewed the
corporation sole for his episcopacy, endorsing instead a trustee
arrangement with lay involvement "'to accommodate Catholic
ecclesiastical structures and practices to the democratic 61an of the
age."'37 The Church might have abandoned the corporation sole entirely
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (7th ed. 1999); see also HOWARD L. OLECK,
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS 20 (5th ed. 1988)
(describing the corporation sole as a "one-man corporation").
33. Harold J. Laski, The Early History of the Corporation in England, 30 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 573-78 (1917).
34. See James B. O'Hara, The Modern Corporation Sole, 93 DICK. L. REV. 23, 26
(1988) (tracing the origin of the corporation sole to ecclesiastical management of church
property in the mid-fifteenth century). The corporation sole served a secular function as
well, according to William Blackstone, as it defined the English monarchy. WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *469 ("[T]he king is a sole corporation [and] so is a
bishop .. ") (footnote omitted); see also Frederic Maitland, The Crown As Corporation,
17 LAW Q. REV. 131, 131-32 (1901) (marking the birth of the King of England's
corporation sole with Sir Edward Coke's description of the "crown as corporation").
Despite the corporation sole's English heritage, canon law was so pervasive an influence
that recognition of the ecclesiastical origins of English law has been subdued. See Edward
D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 484
(1961). Professor Re writes:
It must be obvious that the failure to attribute a separate treatment to the
canon law is not because it has not made a monumental contribution. Rather,
since the canonical influence has been the sturdy thread that has given body and
texture to the entire legal fabric, it has been impossible to separate its influence
throughout the discussion of other areas.
Id.
35. Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502, 1509-10 (1973).
36. Id. at 1509-11. The civil form exemplified by the king was in even worse shape
after American independence. See O'Hara, supra note 34, at 28-29. O'Hara identifies
only a few civil offices that remained corporation soles in the United States as late as 1847:
some probate judges, some town supervisors, and the Governor of Tennessee. See id.
37. THOMAS W. SPALDING, THE PREMIER SEE, 19, 21 (1989) (quoting PATRICK W.
CAREY, PEOPLE, PRIESTS, AND PRELATES: ECCLESIASTICAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
TENSIONS OF TRUSTEEISM 17 (1987)). Additionally, anti-hierarchical sentiment
influenced many states legislatures to enact laws requiring lay ownership of Church
property. See Kauper & Ellis, supra note 35, at 1511, 1520-22.
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were it not for lay abuse of Church property.3" As a result, in 1832, the
Maryland General Assembly agreed to incorporate the Archdiocese of
Baltimore as a corporation sole.39 Eventually, most dioceses across the
United States organized as corporations sole.40
About one-half of states provide by statute for the corporation sole asS • 41
a form of incorporation for religious organizations. Some statutes, such
as Washington State's, require adherence to the doctrine of the bishop's
church in exchange for corporate powers:
Any person, being the bishop, overseer or presiding elder of
any church or religious denomination in this state, may, in
conformity with the constitution, canons, rules, regulations or
discipline of such church or denomination, become a
corporation sole, . . . and, thereupon, said [person] ... together
with his successors in office or position . . . shall be held and
42deemed to be a body corporate ....
Other statutes, like Colorado's, allow corporations sole to "hold and
maintain real, personal, and mixed property . . . and perform all other
acts in furtherance of the objects and purposes of the corporation not
inconsistent with the statutes of [the] state., 43  Some state laws more
38. SPALDING, supra note 37, at 91-93; J.A. Chisholm, Civil Incorporation of Church
Property, in CATHOLIC ENCYC., http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07719b.htm (last
visited Oct. 29, 2005). The First Provincial Council of Baltimore declared:
"Since lay trustees have too often abused the power given them by the civil law,
to the great detriment of religion, we greatly desire that in the future no church
shall be built or consecrated unless it shall have been assigned, by written
instrument to the bishop in whose diocese it is to be built, wherever this can be
done."
Id. (quoting the fifth decree of the First Provincial Council of Baltimore).
39. See SPALDING, supra note 37, at 116-17.
40. See id. at 117.
41. See Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995
BYU L. REV. 439, 456 (1995). Gerstenblith reports that as of 1995, twelve states explicitly
permitted religious organizations to incorporate as corporations sole with some variation;
nine states had, at one time or another, enacted special legislation granting the
corporation sole to certain religious groups; three states had a form of corporation sole not
explicitly described as such; and two states recognized only the common law corporation
sole. Id. at 456-58.
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010 (West 2005). The Oregon statute reads similarly.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067 (2003).
43. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-52-103 (2004); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-11901
(West 2004) ("Corporations may be formed to acquire, hold and dispose of church or
religious society property for the benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public
worship .. "); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419-1 (LexisNexis 2004) (permitting Hawaiian
corporations sole "for the purposes of administering and managing the affairs, property,
and temporalities of the church"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 84.050 (LexisNexis 1999)
(declaring that in Nevada "[a] corporation sole shall have power ... [t]o acquire and
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specifically describe the powers of a corporation sole; for example, the
Washington statute reads: "All property held in such official capacity by
such bishop ... shall be in trust for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof
of his religious denomination, society or church." 44  The articles of
incorporation for a corporation sole reflect this language of a trust.
45
B. The Elements of a Trust
A trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising
from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship and
subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal
with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons.
Elementally, a trust requires only a trustee, beneficiary, property, and a
settlor who creates the trust. The settlor must properly manifest an
possess . . . and to hold and maintain property, real, personal and mixed ... as may be
necessary to carry on or promote the objects of the corporation").
44. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.030; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-3-205
(2003) (stating that a corporation sole in Montana shall hold property "in trust for the use,
purpose, and benefit" of the religious organization); GUAM CODE ANN. tit 18, § 10105
(1992) (declaring that all properties a bishop in Guam administers "shall be held in trust
by him as a corporation sole for the use, purpose, behoof, and sole benefit of his religious
denomination, society, or church, including hospitals, schools, colleges, orphan asylums,
parsonages, and cemeteries thereof"). In Montana and Washington, the powers of a
corporation sole operate "for the purpose of the trust." See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 35-3-
205; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.020.
45. See, e.g., Affidavit of Nicholas P. Cafardi Exhibit E at art. I, Comm. of Tort
Litigants v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane) Case No.
04-08822-PCW11, Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. May 27, 2005). The
articles of incorporation for the Diocese of Spokane, adopted in 1915, specifically
designate that they are "subscribed ...in the manner prescribed" by Washington's
corporation sole statute. Id. at art. IV.
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003); see also GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (rev.
2d ed. 1984) (adopting the definition in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts: "a fiduciary
relationship in which one person holds a property interest, subject to an equitable
obligation to keep or use that interest for the benefit of another").
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2 cmt. f, 3 (2003). A fuller definition
elsewhere describes a trustee as
[o]ne who, having legal title to property, holds it in trust for the benefit of
another and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary. Generally, a trustee's
duties are ... to protect and preserve the trust property, and to ensure that it is
employed solely for the beneficiary, in accordance with the directions contained
in the trust instrument.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (7th ed. 1999). A corporation may serve the role of the
trustee provided that this capacity is consistent with the corporate purpose. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 33(1) cmt. b (2003). Furthermore, "no policy of the
trust law restricts the types of property interests a trustee may hold in that fiduciary
capacity." Id. § 40 cmt. b.
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intention to create the trust 48 and may be a trustee or a beneficiary.
49
Thus, so long as there exists an "external expression of intention,"
neither insufficient language nor failure to hand over a trust instrument
will defeat a trust relationship.0 When the existence of a trust is
doubtful, decisive are the "[a]cts or communications prior to and
subsequent to, as well as those contemporaneous with, the transfer or
other act that is claimed to create a trust."'" If the trust concerns land, a
writing is required•. However, trusts also may be created by statute:
Some... American statutes ... not only create or provide for
the creation of trusts, but also give some details as to the
method of execution of the trusts, such as the trustee's duties as
to the disposition of the funds, accountings, and termination.
To this extent these statutory trusts are not normal trusts[]
53
Whether a "normal" or statutory trust exists, the trustee ordinarily
possesses legal title of the property while the beneficiary commands an
equitable interest.
C. The Church's Own Legal System: Canon Law
Much like the universality of basic trust elements, the Code of Canon
Law applies universally to the Church. 55 The Code addresses the
Church's hierarchical constitution. 56  Canon law also addresses
relationships with norms outside the Code; specifically, its subjects are
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 (2003).
49. See id. § 3 cmts. c, d.
50. See id. § 13 cmts. a, b, c.
51. Id. § 13 cmt. b.
52. Id. § 22, § 22 cmts. a, b. This requirement dates back to an English enactment in
1677 known as the Statute of Frauds. See id. § 13 cmt. a. Most jurisdictions in the United
States have the same requirement. Id. Despite this requirement, an implication of trust
with respect to a corporation sole arises without need of trust language on records or titles.
See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 46, § 37 ("If the [corporation sole] is to be a trustee,
and there is no implication of a trust from the nature of the corporation sole, it would seem
that the Statute of Frauds ... would require a trust of realty to appear on the face of the
deed or will." (emphasis added)).
53. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 46, § 246; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 10 cmt. b (2003) (mentioning examples of statutory trusts such as a recovery in a
wrongful-death action that goes to specially designated individuals and forced elective
share proceeds that benefit a surviving but incapacitated spouse).
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d.
55. See 1983 CODE c.12, § 1 ("All persons for whom universal laws were passed are
bound by them everywhere."). But there can be some slight variations among dioceses.
See id. § 2 ("[A]II persons who are actually present in a certain territory are exempted
from the universal laws which do not have force in that territory.").
56. See id. cc.330-572 (encompassing a section of canon law referred to as "The
Hierarchical Constitution of the Church").
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required to obey canon law as much as civil law, insofar as the latter does
not contravene the formerf Parallels of governance, for example,
58extend to canon law's incorporation of civil-law notions of contract, a
strict-scrutiny standard for reviewing laws that imperil the free exercise
of rights,59 and an interpretation of canon law primarily through the plain
meaning of its text.6°
61
Both legal systems also share the notion of a fictitious legal person.
Canon law prescribes that "[b]esides physical persons, there are also in
the Church juridic persons, that is, subjects in canon law of obligations
and rights which correspond to their nature., 62 The purpose of a juridic
person is to promote "works of piety, of the apostolate or of charity,
whether spiritual or temporal., 63  Some juridic persons are "public,"
founded with a mission to serve the public good.64 Availing themselves
of the "innate right to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal
goods . . . independently of civil power, 65 public juridic persons may
acquire property known as "ecclesiastical goods., 66  Dioceses 67 and
57. See id. c.22 ("Civil laws to which the law of the Church defers should be observed
in canon law with the same effects, insofar as they are not contrary to divine law and
unless it is provided otherwise in canon law.").
58. See id. c.1290. Canon 1290 maintains:
Whatever general and specific regulations on contracts and payments are
determined in civil law for a given territory are to be observed in canon law with
the same effects in a matter which is subject to the governing power of the
Church, unless the civil regulations are contrary to divine law or canon law
makes some other provision ....
Id.
59. See id. c.18 ("Laws which establish a penalty or restrict the free exercise of rights
or which contain an exception to the law are subject to a strict interpretation.").
60. See id. c.17 ("Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood in accord with the proper
meaning of the words considered in their text and context.").
61. See HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 11-12 (2d ed. 1970) (crediting the creation of the persona
ficta in the thirteenth century to Pope Innocent IV).
62. 1983 CODE c.113, § 2.
63. Id. c.114, § 2.
64. See id. c.] 16, § 1.
65. Id. c.1254, § 1.
66. See id. c.1257, § 1. The designation of ecclesiastical goods has a twofold effect on
the property owned by a public juridic person: "1) it recognizes the ecclesial value of such
goods; 2) it declares such goods subject to the power of the competent ecclesiastical
authority, remaining firm that the property belongs to the single juridic persons." Affidavit
of Nicholas P. Cafardi Exhibit D, supra note 45, at 1.
67. See 1983 CODE c.369. Canon 369 defines a diocese as
a portion of the people of God which is entrusted for pastoral care to a bishop
with the cooperation of the presbyterate, so that, adhering to its pastor and
gathered by him in the Holy Spirit through the gospel and the Eucharist, it
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parishes are some such juridic persons, each one juridically individual
and separate.69
Under canon 1256, "ownership over goods ... belongs to that juridic
person which has lawfully acquired them."7 °  These and other
ecclesiastical goods are to be administered by the bishop for his diocese7'
or by the pastor for his parish," but in all cases, they are "bound to fulfill
their office with the diligence of a good householder., 73  Among their
primary duties are:
10 take care that none of the goods entrusted to their care is
in any way lost or damaged... ;
20 take care that the ownership of ecclesiastical goods is
safeguarded through civilly valid methods;
30 observe the prescriptions of both canon and civil law or
those imposed by the founder, donor or legitimate authority;
they must especially be on guard lest the Church be harmed
74through the non-observance of civil laws ....
constitutes a particular church in which the one, holy, catholic and apostolic
Church of Christ is truly present and operative.
Id.
68. See id. c.515, § 1 (defining a parish as "a definite community of the Christian
faithful established on a stable basis within a particular church; the pastoral care of the
parish is entrusted to a pastor as its own shepherd under the authority of the diocesan
bishop").
69. See id. c.373 ("[O]nce [dioceses] have been legitimately erected [they] enjoy
juridic personality by reason of the law itself."); id. c.515, § 3 ("A legitimately erected
parish has juridic personality by the law itself.").
70. Id. c.1256.
71. See id. c.393 ("The diocesan bishop represents his diocese in all its juridic
affairs."). The bishop is required to administer his diocese with the assistance of a finance
council. Id. c.492, §§ 1-3.
72. Id. c.532 ("The pastor represents the parish in all juridic affairs in accord with the
norm of law ... "). A pastor must establish a finance council to assist him. Id. c.537.
73. Id. c.1284, § 1.
74. Id. § 2. Other duties admonish the householder to:
40 accurately collect the revenues and income of goods when they are legally
due, safeguard them once collected, and apply them according to the intention of
the founder or according to legitimate norms;
50 pay the interest on a loan or mortgage when it is due and take care that
the capital debt itself is repaid in due time;
60 with the consent of the ordinary invest the money which is left over after
expenses and which can be profitably allocated for the goals of the juridic person;
70 keep well ordered books of receipts and expenditures;
8' draw up a report on their administration at the end of each year;
90 duly arrange and keep in a suitable and safe archive the documents and
deeds upon which are based the rights of the Church or the institution to its
goods; deposit authentic copies of them in the archive of the curia when it can be
done conveniently.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
Additionally, administrators of Church property must observe the
restriction on alienation of Church property by obtaining permission
from the "competent authority according to the norm of law" whenever
alienation of a juridic person's "stable patrimony" exceeds the sum that
canon law prescribes."
Should canon law require amplification, recourse is available through
other interpretive principles such as "the mind of the legislator. ',76 To
this end, Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts
"consists mainly in interpreting the laws of the Church" and
"publish[ing] authentic interpretations confirmed by pontifical
authority."' 7 Short of these authentic interpretations of canon law, the
Code contains procedures for adjudging rights under it.78 Ordinarily, the
diocesan bishop is the adjudicator of canon law within his diocese.79
However, if the disagreement involves the diocese itself, the Roman
Rota-the Church's highest courts°-hears the case."'
Id.
75. Id. c.1291; see also id. c.1292. The competent ecclesiastical authority is the
diocesan bishop unless the sum exceeds $500,000, at which amount a diocesan bishop in
the United States must obtain permission from the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops. See id. c.1292, § 1; Robert T. Kennedy, Title III: Contracts and Especially
Alienation, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, 1492, 1496-98 (John P.
Beal et al. eds., 2000). An amount greater than $3 million requires approval by the Holy
See. See 1983 CODE c.1292, § 2; Kennedy, supra, at 1497. "Stable patrimony" means "all
property, real or personal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, that, either of its
nature or by explicit designation, is destined to remain in the possession of its owner for a
long or indefinite period of time to afford financial security for the future." Id. at 1495.
76. See 1983 CODE c.17.
77. John Paul II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION PASTOR BONUS, 25 JUNE 1988, arts.
154, 155 (Francis C.C.F. Kelly et al. trans., 1999) (1998).
78. See 1983 CODE cc.1400-1716.
79. See id. c.1419, § 1. When the case concerns the "temporal goods of a juridic
person," an appellate tribunal in the diocese has jurisdiction over the matter. Id. § 2. The
bishop appoints judges, who are to be clerics, to the diocese's tribunal. Id. c.1421, § 1.
Adjudicating disputes over the use of diocesan property is part of the tribunal's function.
See Lawrence G. Wrenn, Title 1I: Different Grades and Kinds of Tribunals, in NEW
COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 75, at 1622, 1622-23, 1649.
80. See Wrenn, supra note 79, at 1633; see also 1983 CODE cc.1442-43 (describing the
Pope's establishment of the Rota as the tribunal to receive appeals).
81. 1983 CODE c.1405, § 3. Under Canon 1296, the adversely affected juridic person
must weigh its options carefully before it seeks restitution:
Whenever ecclesiastical goods have been alienated without the required
canonical formalities but the alienation is civilly valid, it is the responsibility of
the competent authority, after a thorough consideration of the situation, to
decide whether and what type of action, that is, a personal or real action, is to be
initiated to vindicate the rights of the Church as well as by whom and against
whom such an action is to be initiated.
Id. c.1296.
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D. The Bankruptcy Estate and Its Limits
1. Creating the Bankruptcy Estate
In the bankruptcy realm, cases are always heard by the courts
constitutionally designated for this purpose.82 Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197883 to provide for bankruptcy under
several chapters, each with its own purpose and applicability. 84 Chapter
11 is designed to allow a debtor to reorganize its financial affairs while
satisfying creditors.85 The particular appeal of Chapter 11 is that it allows
a debtor to continue its operations as it reorganizes. 6 After filing a
petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court and obtaining an order
of relief, the debtor will remain in possession of its assets during
bankruptcy proceedings. 87 Furthermore, the debtor can play a large role
in presenting a plan for reorganization. 8 The public policy behind
bankruptcy-achieving an equitable balance between debtor and
creditor -is advanced in this way.'9
Filing a bankruptcy petition creates an estate of the debtor's property,
which includes under § 541(a) "all legal or equitable interests of the
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... To establish...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... ).
83. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
84. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (2000) (providing bankruptcy protection for "a
family farmer with regular annual income"); id. §§ 1301-1330 (providing bankruptcy
protection for an individual with regular income).
85. See id. §§ 1101-1174 note; see also S. REP. No. 95-1106, at 1 (1978).
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 1108.
87. Cf § 1104 (explaining the circumstances under which a trustee or examiner would
take possession of the debtor's assets).
88. See id. § 1121.
89. See S. REP. No. 95-1106, at 1 (1978) ("The overall objectives of [the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978] are to make bankruptcy procedures more efficient, to balance more
equitably the interests of different creditors, to give greater recognition to the interests of
general unsecured creditors who enjoy no priority in the distribution of the assets of the
debtor's estate, and to give the debtor a less encumbered 'fresh start' after bankruptcy.");
see also Veryl Victoria Miles, Assessing Modern Bankruptcy Law: An Example of Justice,
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1025, 1035-36 (1996). Professor Miles writes:
Our current bankruptcy law.., is a law of equity. As a law premised on
equity and focused on balancing the interests of all affected parties, its purpose is
not only to provide relief to the distressed debtor, but also to achieve a fair and
just settlement of the various creditors' claims in any property of the debtor that
is available to satisfy these claims.... This, in essence, is the justice of modern
bankruptcy law. It is a law responding to the plea for relief of the bankrupt
debtor, while resolving to treat all creditors fairly and equitably according to
their claims of financial contribution from a once financially viable debtor.
Miles, supra, at 1035-36 (footnotes omitted).
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debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."' The debtor's
property is determined under state law in most instances,9' and
accordingly, "the basic federal rule is that state law governs." 92  Only
when there is a controlling federal interest will property fail to be defined
by state law.93
2. Limiting the Bankruptcy Estate
a. Section 541(d)
In its maiden consideration by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc.,94 § 541(a)(1) was defined broadly in accordance with
Congress' apparent wish to subsume into the bankruptcy estate a wide
range of property.95 Though affirming the expansive scope of the
bankruptcy estate, the Court also noted its boundaries. 96 One such limit
is § 541(d):
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement
of the case, only legal title and not an equitable interest ...
90. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Other property interests specified in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)
are: community property of a debtor and debtor spouse, id. § 541(a)(2); various interests
recoverable by a trustee, id. § 541(a)(3); certain interests in property preserved for the
benefit of the estate, id. § 541(a)(4); interests acquired by the debtor within 180 days after
the commencement of the case that would have been part of the bankruptcy estate at the
commencement of the case, id. § 541(a)(5); most proceeds, rents, or profits of the
bankruptcy estate, id. § 541(a)(6); and any interest that the estate acquires after the
commencement of the case, id. § 541 (a)(7).
91. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), superseded by statute,
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 214(a), 108 Stat. 4126 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2000)) ("Property interests are created and defined by
state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved
in a bankruptcy proceeding."). State courts have explicitly recognized this principle. See,
e.g., Am. States Ins. Co. v. Symes of Silverdale, Inc., 78 P.3d 1266, 1268 (Wash. 2003).
92. Butner, 440 U.S. at 57.
93. Cf. Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992); see, e.g., Symes, 78 P.3d at 1268
(acknowledging that state property interests control only to the extent that they are not
contrary to federal law).
94. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
95. Id. at 204-05 ("Both the congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations and
Congress' choice of methods to protect secured creditors suggest that Congress intended a
broad range of property to be included in the estate."). Why a unanimous Court, id. at
199, needed to undertake a review of legislative history to confirm Congress' intent,
despite the statute's perspicuity, is curious. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Decisions, 3
CHAP. L. REV. 173, 215 (2000) ("It is not immediately clear.., why the Court considered
structure, history and/or pre-Code practice to confirm an apparently clear meaning in ...
Whiting Pools.... ").
96. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.8 (discussing the congressional record pertaining
to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000)).
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becomes property of the estate ...only to the extent of the
debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any
equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not
hold.97
The legislative history reveals that in drafting § 541(d), Congress was
concerned with the legal and equitable division of trust property:
"Situations occasionally arise where property ostensibly belonging to the
debtor will actually not be property of the debtor, but will be held in trust
for another." 98  In such a situation, the legal interest belongs to the
debtor but the beneficiary of the trust possesses the equitable interest,
and so the bankruptcy estate can include the title, but not the beneficial
interest.99 Accordingly, if the debtor holds bare legal title and no
equitable interest, the bankruptcy estate acquires only bare legal title:9 9
"To the extent such an interest is limited in the hands of the debtor, it is
equally limited in the hands of the estate ... .""'
b. The Bankruptcy Estate Excludes Property Held in Statutory Trust
In Begier v. IRS, °2 the Supreme Court used § 541(d) as a springboard
to determine whether funds held by the debtor pursuant to a statutory
trust belonged to the bankruptcy estate.0 3  American International
Airways (AIA) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after failing, among
other things, to collect and withhold employee and excise taxes for the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).04 AIA could not comply with its "trust-
fund" obligations, which by statute required that "'the amount of tax so
collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the
United States."'1 0 5 Right before filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, AIA
had made payments from its general operating fund to try to meet its
97. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d); see Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.8.
98. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
99. See 124 CONG. REc. 24, 32,417 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards).
100. Id. at 32,399. Section 541 does not exclude bare legal title because title is still an
interest. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 431 n.4 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that property interests of a debtor with bare legal title belong in the
bankruptcy estate); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
101. 124 CONG. REC. 24, 32,399 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards).
102. 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
103. See id. at 58-62.
104. See id. at 55-56.
105. Id. at 56, 60 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7501). Trust-fund obligations exist at the state
level as well. See, e.g., State ex rel. Trenholm v. Yelle, 25 P.2d 569, 570 (Wash. 1933)
(holding that funds set aside pursuant to a state workmen's compensation act are "trust
funds drawn from particular sources and devoted to special purposes"). Moreover, "[b]y
the act itself" and without any further designation by the legislature, the fund is a statutory
trust. See id.
Catholic University Law Review
trust-fund obligations.'6 Begier, the court-appointed trustee who
managed AIA's bankruptcy estate, sought to retain for AIA's creditors
as many of its assets as possible, including trust-fund payments to the
IRS, by avoiding these transfers.07
The Court rejected Begier's attempt to circumvent § 541(d).08 Begier
argued that because AIA neither sent the trust-fund amount to the IRS
nor deposited this money in an account different than AIA's general
operating fund, no trust existed.1°9 The Court relied on the statutory
language mandating that employers withhold and collect taxes for the
IRS when employees are paid; the money became the property of the
IRS and ceased to be AIA's "at the moment the relevant payments...
were made.""0  Moreover, according to the Court, the trust relationship
does not require a segregation of those funds held for the IRS, deflecting
Begier's argument that segregation was the prerequisite to a trust."' The
Court held that "[tihe mere fact that AIA neither placed the taxes it
collected in a segregated fund nor paid them to the IRS does not
somehow mean that AIA never collected the taxes in the first place."" 2
106. Begier, 496 U.S. at 56.
107. Id. at 56-57. Section 547(b) authorizes a trustee to exercise avoidance power to
prevent certain payments, dispersed ninety days prior to the bankruptcy petition, from
going to certain creditors in derogation of the pro rata share of the bankruptcy estate
belonging to all creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000).
108. See Begier, 496 U.S. at 60.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 60-62; see also Trenholm, 25 P.2d at 570 ("These funds are therefore not
subject to appropriation by the Legislature for purposes other than those contemplated by
the act, nor by methods that run counter to the effective operation of the act.").
111. Begier, 496 U.S. at 61.
112. Id. at 60. The Court then pursued its determination of what "particular dollars"
belonged to the IRS. Id. at 62. The Court began this discussion by observing, "[in the
absence of specific statutory guidance .... we might naturally begin with the common-law
rules that have been created to answer such questions about other varieties of trusts." Id.
at 62. The Court further explained that "[u]nder common-law principles, a trust is created
in property; a trust therefore does not come into existence until the settlor identifies an
ascertainable interest in property to be the trust res." Id. But then, upon deciding that the
statutory trust is "radically different" from common-law trusts, the Court abandoned its
common-law examination. Id. The Court resorted to scant legislative history to
determine that the general operating funds AIA transferred to the IRS amounted to trust
property within the meaning of the bankruptcy code. Id. at 63-67. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia dismissed the need for divining Congress's intention and stuck to
the common-law approach: "A trust without a res can no more be created by legislative
decree than can a pink rock-candy mountain." Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia argued that IRS regulations by themselves could be read to infer
the trust relationship. Id.
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E. Churches and the First Amendment
1. Introduction
The First Amendment declares: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ... ,,13 Since at least 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder,'1 4 modern First
Amendment jurisprudence has maintained a "requirement for
governmental neutrality."'1 5 In 1990, the Supreme Court reexamined its
jurisprudence on the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.116 Rejecting a requirement
that the government must show a compelling justification for all burdens
to free exercise,"7 the Court in Smith announced that incidental burdens
on free exercise, if occasioned by laws that are religion-neutral and
generally applicable, do not offend the First Amendment. 8  The
Supreme Court revisited its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,"9 holding that
burdens to religion that are neither neutral nor generally applied are
subject to "the most rigorous of scrutiny. Dissatisfied with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, Congress
restored the stricter standard that antedated Smith by passing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 21  Though
unconstitutional when applied to state laws, 12  RFRA is still law in the
113. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
115. Cf id. at 220.
116. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
117. Id. at 888-89. The "compelling governmental interest," id. at 883, or "compelling
state interest" test originated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Cf. id. at 882-
83. The Sherbert Court defined a compelling governmental interest as one where "no
showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."' Id. at 406 (alteration in original)
(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), provides another formulation of compelling state interest. ("[O]nly those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion.").
118. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 ("[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the
object of the [law to which citizens object] but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.").
119. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
120. Id. at 546.
121. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)).
122. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534, 536 (1997).
Catholic University Law Review
federal sphere.'23 Smith has likewise been parsed; some court opinions,
concerned about free-exercise infringement, have held that Smith applies
114only to individuals, not churches.
2. Smith: Shielding the State from Free Exercise Claims
In Smith, in which two Oregonians challenged the constitutionality of
prohibiting peyote use despite its religious purposes,'25 Justice Scalia
noted for the Court that in all its decisions on the Free Exercise Clause,
[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate .... "To permit this
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself."
... [Tihe right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).'
'26
In dismissing the compelling-interest formula of Sherbert v. Verner,1
27
Justice Scalia opined that the Sherbert test was created "in a context that
lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for
123. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 n.2 (2005); O'Bryan v. Bureau of
Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 400-01 (7th Cir. 2003); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1219-22
(9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 1998).
124. See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299,
1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am.,
83 F.3d 455, 462-63, 467-68 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
125. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-76 (1990).
Having lost their jobs for ingesting peyote, which was illegal under Oregon law, the
petitioners subsequently were denied unemployment benefits because they were fired for
work-related misconduct. Id. at 874. They sued the state claiming infringement of their
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion because they used peyote as part of
their membership in the Native American Church. See id. Because the criminal
prohibition made no exception for religious use of peyote, the Oregon Supreme Court
ruled that the law violated the First Amendment. Id. at 876. The Supreme Court
reversed. Id. at 890. The First Amendment, despite its language prohibiting only
Congress' actions, applies to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
126. Id. at 878-79 (citations omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
166-67 (1879); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
127. 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406-07 (1963); see supra note 117 (stating formulations of
Sherbert and other courts).
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the relevant conduct.' '2  Moving forward, Sherbert would not be
available to challenge, on the basis of free exercise, "[t]he government's
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct [and] other aspects of public policy.' ' 29 Despite this limitation
on free-exercise claims, the government's free hand can be tempered by
the political process: "[A] society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value
in its legislation .. .
3. Lukumi: Unsheathing the Sword of Free Exercise Protection
Hialeah, Florida was not so solicitous, according to the Supreme Court
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.131 The
Court found that a city ordinance outlawing animal killing was
discriminatory toward the Santeria religion because the law required a
case-by-case evaluation of the reasons for the killing and, thus, under
Smith, "represent[ed] a system of 'individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.",132  Any
individualized exemptions to the general prohibition of animal killing,
such as those exemptions for non-Santeria animal killings, required the
government to extend those exemptions to cases of "'religious hardship"'
133
unless it could show compelling reasons not to do so. Without a
compelling reason, this type of government action is not neutral and
generally applicable and thus offends the First Amendment. 134 Any law
"failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest. '135 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, warned that the
128. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
129. Id. at 885 (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
130. Id. at 890. In recommending this approach, Justice Scalia points out that "[j]ust as
a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First
Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the
printed word," the same society "can be expected" to protect freedom of religion through
negative legislative protections. See id.
131. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
132. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884); see id. at 524-28, 537-38.
133. See id. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
134. Id. at 531-32.
135. Id. With respect to the first requirement, neutrality, the Court observed that the
Free Exercise Clause "'forbids subtle departures from neutrality."' Id. at 534 (quoting
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)). As to the second requirement, general
applicability, it "'protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment."' Id. at 542
(alteration in original) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480
U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia described the latter requirement as one that "applies primarily to those laws
which, though neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement
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Court would not be satisfied with superficial observance of the First
Amendment: "Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement
of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.0 13 6 Not even the
pursuit of legitimate interests justifies the selective application of the law
with respect to free-exercise rights.'37 Justice Kennedy ended the opinion
with an overture to religious tolerance, refrain from the suspicions of
animosity or distrust, and a call that "all officials must pause to
remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it
secures."
138
4. In Need of a Bigger Sword: Legislative and Judicial Attempts to Keep
Free Exercise Rights Broad
In 1993 Congress took the next crack at defining free-exercise rights by
passing RFRA 139 which provides: "Government may substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of
the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest. '' 140 In 1997, the Supreme Court in
City of Boerne v. Flores invalidated RFRA with respect to state laws.4
The Court declared that Congress, when it sought to extend RFRA to
state governments, exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 42 Though now unconstitutional with respect to state laws,
target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment." Id. at 557
(Scalia, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 534 (majority opinion).
137. See id. at 543 ("The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests,
cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief
is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.").
138. Id. at 547.
139. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b), 1(b)(1), 1(b)(2) (2000). Congress' declared purpose in
enacting RFRA was
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.
Id. § 2000bb(b)(1)-(2).
141. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
142. Id. at 536. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to "enforce
by appropriate legislation," prohibitions against "any State depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. The
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RFRA's constitutionality in the federal realm is widely recognized. 1
43
The rationale for this recognition is that Congress' authority to enact
federal legislation "rests securely on Art. I. § 8 cl. 18," unlike Congress'
remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
144
Courts have held that when acting pursuant to this power, Congress has
both the ability and duty to interpret the Constitution in its own way.
14 5
Boerne's invalidation of RFRA as applied to state laws, according to
one court of appeals, "does not alter the structure of RFRA, it simply
prevents the application of the statute to a certain class of defendants.
1 46
In Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 47 the first
challenge to RFRA's federal-law application after Boerne in the Eighth
Circuit, that court flatly rejected the argument that Boerne made RFRA
"a 'dead-letter.", 148  Looking to both the Bankruptcy Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause to uphold RFRA's constitutionality
regarding federal laws, 49 the court sought to resolve whether Congress
exceeded its authority by applying RFRA to the Bankruptcy Code.
The court noted that Congress had the power to enact both RFRA and
bankruptcy laws; therefore Congress "effectively amended the
Bankruptcy Code" with RFRA.'' Accordingly, the court held that
although a trustee in bankruptcy could ordinarily avoid debtors'
transactions during insolvency, RFRA prevented the trustee from
avoiding over thirteen thousand dollars in tithes two debtors made to
their church. 2 To recover this amount both "'substantially burden[ed]
Supreme Court opposed and countered Congress' end-run around Smith. See Boerne, 521
U.S. at 512-16, 536 ("[I]t is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control.").
143. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 n.2 (2005) ("RFRA, Courts of
Appeals have held, remains operative as to the Federal Government and federal
territories and possessions.").
144. O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003).
145. See, e.g., Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002) ("When Congress
acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to
make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.") (citing
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535).
146. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959-60 (10th Cir. 2001).
147. 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
148. Id. at 856, 859.
149. Id. at 856. The Necessary and Proper Clause reads, "The Congress shall have
Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers," which includes the power "[t]o establish . . . uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
8, cls. 1, 4, 18.
150. Id. at 860.
151. Young, 141 F.3d at 861.
152. See id. at 857, 863.
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the debtors' free exercise of their religion and [was] not in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest.
' ',153
Other reinforcement of Smith's broad effects stems from uncertainty
about whether Smith was intended to be an across-the-board reversal of
the compelling-interest test.154 In one such examination, the D.C. Circuit
in EEOC v. Catholic University of America,'55 found that where the
University's School of Canon Law denied tenure to a nun allegedly
because of her gender,156 the court was confronted with "a collision
between two interests of the highest order: the Government's interest in
eradicating discrimination in employment and the constitutional right of
a church to manage its own affairs free from governmental
interference. 15 7  The court noted that Supreme Court decisions
described burdens to religion in "two quite different ways": interference
with an individual's beliefs or encroachment on church autonomy."" TheD.C. Circuit concluded that Smith applied only to the former category.15 9
153. Id. at 857 (quoting its earlier opinion in Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996)). Another potentially substantial
burden on free exercise under RFRA is a prohibition by the Bureau of Prisons on
"'casting of spells/curses,"' an impediment for adherents of Wicca. See O'Bryan v. Bureau
of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 400-02 (7th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that despite concerns about
disruptions should a curse become revealed, "relying on other inmates' reactions to a
religious practice is a form of hecklers' veto. The RFRA does not allow governments to
defeat claims so easily."). Without seeing any proof of disruption in the prison system that
would flow from permitting curses/spells, the court could not determine whether there
existed a compelling governmental interest and, accordingly, remanded for further
findings. Id. at 401.
Similarly, in Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001), the court held that if a
prisoner could prove he was denied access to "a Christian minister who is also familiar
with the spiritual culture of Japan, Plaintiff's homeland," then, under RFRA, the denial
would be a substantial burden to his free exercise of religion. Id. at 961.
154. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento
Co., 85 P.3d 67, 98-100 (Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting); Gellington v. Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent.
Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349-50 (5th Cir.
1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
155. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 458-59.
157. Id. at 460; accord Combs, 173 F.3d at 351 (appreciating that the case before the
court "involve[d] the interrelationship between two important government directives-the
congressional mandate to eliminate discrimination in the workplace and the constitutional
mandate to preserve the separation of church and state").
158. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 460.
159. See id. at 462-63 ("[W]e cannot believe that the Supreme Court in Smith intended
to qualify this century-old affirmation of a church's sovereignty over its own affairs.");
accord Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303 ("The Smith decision focused on the first type of
government infringement on the right of free exercise of religion-infringement on an
individual's ability to observe the practices of his or her religion."); Combs, 173 F.3d at 349
("Smith's language is clearly directed at the first strand of free exercise law, where an
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The court reasoned that questions of Church autonomy encompass a
"fundamentally different character" than individuals' beliefs6 and none
of the dangers against which Smith intoned are present when the Church
exercises its authority to hire ministers or their equivalent.16' Moreover,
a "long line of Supreme Court cases" have affirmed church sovereignty
to "'decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.",1
62
The scope of civil involvement in determining ownership of church
property reached the Supreme Court as early as 1872 in Watson v.
Jones.163  The Court observed that, more often than not, these
intrachurch disputes concerning the proper ownership of church property
involve a hierarchical church. 164 In such an instance, the religious "body
holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general
church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals
with a general and ultimate power of control . . . in some supreme
judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization."'1
65
Accordingly, civil courts must defer to ecclesiastical authority on a
individual contends that, because of his religious beliefs, he should not be required to
conform with generally applicable laws."). Indeed, Smith approvingly cited cases that
involved church autonomy. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The government may not.., lend its power to one or the other side
in controversies over religious authority or dogma." (citations omitted)).
160. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462.
161. Id. Specifically, the court failed to see-how a church member became "'a law unto
himself' when the church exercised its authority to hire its own ministers. Id. (quoting
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885). Similarly, use of a compelling-interest analysis would not require
the determination of central religious beliefs to uphold church authority. Id.; see also id. at
461 (explaining that numerous courts have "long held that the Free Exercise Clause...
precludes civil courts from adjudicating employment discrimination suits by ministers
against the church or religious institution employing them"). The aggrieved employee in
Catholic University of America came within the ministerial exception by its extension to
other "ministerial function[s]." Id. at 461 (citing EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F.
Supp. 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1994)).
162. Id. at 462-63 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). In Kedroff, the Supreme Court
invalidated a New York statute declaring that St. Nicholas Cathedral belonged to a
particular bishop and that all Russian Orthodox Churches in New York must "in all other
respects conform to, maintain and follow the faith, doctrine, ritual, communion, discipline,
canon law, traditions and usages of the Eastern Confession." Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 99, 121.
The Court commented that the church's "conformity is by legislative fiat and subject to
legislative will. Should the state assert power to change the statute requiring conformity
to ancient faith and doctrine to one establishing a different doctrine, the invalidity would
be unmistakable." Id. at 108. Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church of N. Am., 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960), extends Kedroff to judicial actions.
163. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
164. See id. at 722-23, 726 (observing that cases involving a church hierarchy are the
most common types of church property disputes).
165. Id. at 722-23.
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question of the ownership of church property "whenever the questions of
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been
decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried."' 66 No matter their ability, civil judges cannot unpack
ecclesiastical law. 167 Similarly, regardless of its divine authority, a church
court cannot adjudicate rights of real or personal property if "the right in
no sense depends on ecclesiastical questions.',
68
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 69 the Illinois
Supreme Court's detailed review of church law involved an attempted
reconciliation of internal church procedures.17 0  The court first
considered, and then dismissed, interpretations of canon law made by the
highest tribunals of the Serbian Orthodox Church.171  In writing the
Supreme Court's opinion, Justice Brennan rejected this approach:
The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court
is that it rests upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions
of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church
166. Id. at 727. Some states continue to employ this approach. See, e.g., Diocese of
Newark v. Burns, 417 A.2d 31, 33-34 (N.J. 1980); Presbytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh,
485 P.2d 615, 618-19 (Wash. 1971).
167. Cf Watson, 80 U.S. at 729. The majority in Watson implored for judicial restraint:
It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in
the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in
each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the
more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is
less so.
Id.
168. Id. at 733. In a closer case, the Court also recognized that a church court is not
the proper tribunal for trying an alleged murderer. See id. at 732-33 ("[It may very well
be conceded that if the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church should undertake to
try one of its members for murder, and punish him with death or imprisonment, its
sentence would be of no validity in a civil court or anywhere else.").
169. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). Bishop Milivojevich sued in Illinois state court to contest his
removal from office and prevent reorganization of his diocese. See id. at 706-07. The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the proceedings to remove Milivojevich were arbitrary
according to the court's understanding of the church constitution and its penal code. Id. at
708. The Illinois Supreme Court modified its opinion after denying a rehearing and held
that under church law, Milivojevich was to be reinstated because he was not tried within
one year of his indictment. Id. Furthermore, the court found that the Serbian Orthodox
Church exceeded its authority under church law by reorganizing without the American-
Canadian Diocese's approval. Id. The Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United
States and Canada and the other petitioners then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 698-99.
170. See id. at 717-18.
171. Id. at 718. According to the Supreme Court, the Illinois court should not have
rejected testimony by five expert witnesses on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church
explaining why canon law supported the church's decision. Cf id. at 708, 718, 720. The
court further erred when it accepted testimony by Bishop Milivojevich's expert witness on
his interpretation of canon law. Id. at 718-19.
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upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own
inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of
those disputes. 172
This, Justice Brennan stressed, no civil court could do whenever there
are "quintessentially religious controversies., 7 3 Even though the Serbian
Orthodox Church canonically stripped Bishop Milivojevich of his legal
control over church property, this was an "incidental effect of an
ecclesiastical determination" that civil courts must necessarily accept.
74
Church administration and distribution of property, as illustrated by the
reorganization of a diocese, "involves a matter of internal church
government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.',
75
The Supreme Court announced another constitutionally permissible
approach to resolving church property disputes in Jones v. Wolf. 176 After
a Presbyterian church in Macon, Georgia, separated from the larger
Presbyterian Church of the United States and claimed the church
building, the Georgia Supreme Court advanced the "'neutral principles
of law"' approach. 7   Endorsing this analysis, Justice Blackmun
explained that a state civil court could examine deeds, charters, state
statutes, and the church constitution
for language of trust in favor of the general church. In
undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special
care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not
to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the
document indicates that the parties have intended to create a
172. Id. at 708.
173. Id. at 720.
174. See id.; see also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952) ("Even in those cases when the property
right follows as an incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical
issues, the church rule controls. This under our Constitution necessarily follows in order
that there may be free exercise of religion.").
175. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721.
176. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
177. Id. at 597-99. The Supreme Court first recognized the neutral principles of law
analysis with Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). See also Wolf, 443 U.S. at 599. The Court
in Wolf framed the case thus:
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church property following a
schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization. The
question for decision is whether civil courts, consistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve the dispute on the
basis of "neutral principles of law," or whether they must defer to the resolution
of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church.
Id. at 597. The neutral principles of law analysis is the preferred approach in some states.
See, e.g., Skelton v. Word Chapel, Inc., 637 P.2d 753, 755-56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Decker
v. Berean Baptist Church, 624 P.2d 1094, 1097-98 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
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trust. In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the
corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church
incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the
ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of
the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the
resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative
ecclesiastical body.78
In the Supreme Court's view, applying neutral principles of law to trust
and property disputes provides courts with the freedom to determine the
private rights and obligations that reflect the parties' intentions without• 179
entanglement in religious doctrine.
II. IN GOD WE TRUST
A. Understanding the Trust Created by the Corporation Sole
Arguments for a trust relationship between a diocese and its parishes
that would exclude parish property from a diocese's bankruptcy estate
have not persuaded everyone. 's Plaintiffs' attorneys have argued that
some diocesan deeds of real property fail to mention the existence of a
trust; the only interest evident on those and other documents is that of
the diocese. '  Moreover, according to some plaintiffs in the Spokane
bankruptcy litigation, "[e]very material aspect of the relationship
between the Diocese and the Parishes illustrates the Diocese's complete
control and domination.', 8 2  Specifically, plaintiffs' attorneys have
questioned how this could not be the case, because the diocese is
responsible for appointing priests, paying the priests' retirement benefits,
178. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-04.
179. Id. at 603-05. The majority and dissent disagreed on whether church documents
that do no more than exude doctrine may or may not curtail civil involvement in church
governance. Compare id. at 609 & n.7 (hinting that if a state wants to adjudicate a church
property dispute in which a church Book describes communing members as "'those
admitted to the Lord's Table,"' only neutral principles of law permit civil consideration of
that document) with id. at 612-13 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The constitutional documents
of churches tend to be drawn in terms of religious precepts. Attempting to read them 'in
purely secular terms' is more likely to promote confusion than understanding.").
180. See, e.g., Committee of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 31, (Committee of Tort Litigants v.
Catholic Bishop of Spokane) (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane), Case No. 04-08822-
PCW11 Adv. Case No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. April 7, 2005) ("Since this
bankruptcy began, the Bishop has been playing a shell game with the bulk of the real
property in the Diocese.").
181. See, e.g., id. at 8.
182. Id. at 20.
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coordinating medical benefits, and authorizing the purchases and sales of
Church property in the diocese."3
Any serious attempt to understand the diocese-parish relationship
established by a corporation sole statute should begin with an
examination of the statute itself:
[11n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one,
cardinal canon before all others . . . . [C]ourts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: "judicial
inquiry is complete.'
8 4
The meaning behind any statute should also begin with its language.'
8 5
Therefore, exclusive reliance on historical accounts surrounding certain• 86
dioceses' preferences for the corporation sole is misplaced.
A typical corporation sole statute that arguably creates a trust for
parish property reads: "All property held in such official capacity by such
bishop.., shall be in trust for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof of his
religious denomination, society or church."'" One reading of this statute
posits that the trust exists only to restrict a bishop's personal interest, not
183. See id. at 20-21.
184. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted)
(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). In Washington State, where
two dioceses have filed for bankruptcy and where property will be defined by state law,
the Supreme Court of Washington has seized this logic:
The court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's
intent, and if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give
effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent....
[Tihat meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the
statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision
in question .... [This approach] is more likely to carry out legislative intent. Of
course, if, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one
reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to
aids to construction, including legislative history.
State v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 43 P.3d 4, 9-10 (Wash. 2002).
185. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
186. But see Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 326-27 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005)
(order denying motion to dismiss) (relying on "the historical context"); Reply Brief by Mr.
Shea and Brief in Opposition to Motion of Diocese for Summary Judgment, supra note 31,
at 6-7. Despite the historical circumstances that might have encouraged the use of the
corporation sole, the Vatican expressed concern over its use as early as 1911. See Letter
from the Sacred Congregation of the Council to the Ordinaries of the U.S. (July 29, 1911),
reprinted in 2 T. BOUSCAREN, THE CANON LAW DIGEST, OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED
DOCUMENTS AFFECTING THE CODE OF CANON LAW, 1933-1942, at 443,443-45 (1943).
187. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.030 (West 2005).
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that of his diocese. 8' But if the bishop "as officeholder" and as
"corporation sole" exist as one personality, there is no separating the
interest of the bishop as officeholder from the bishop as corporation
sole.' 9° If the corporation sole is the diocese, T9 the diocese likewise
cannot be separated from the bishop.19 2 Official capacity of the bishop
then equally describes the bishop, the corporation sole, or the diocese.9
Because there is no mention of the bishop's "personal interest" in the
corporation sole statute, 94 it is an interest that can be eliminated from the
equation.95 Therefore, it is the diocese, or bishop, or corporation sole
that holds property "in trust for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof" for
the rest of the Church.196 This relationship, provided by the statutory
trust, is conditioned on "conformity" with Church law.
1 97
Corporation sole statutes that refer to canon law can be deemed to
have incorporated it to one degree or another.98 Incorporation by the
legislature limits the corporate uses of property for which the
corporation sole exists; consequently, despite broad corporate powers
ordinarily conferred on any other corporation, the corporation sole's
powers "can only be exercised validly within the capacity and purpose of
the corporation sole.''99 This statutory restriction to observe canon law
seemingly bars ultra vires actions that contravene the statutorily
permitted trust relationship.
188. See, e.g., In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 326; Committee of
Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, supra note 180, at 10.
189. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.010 (West 2005) ("[S]aid bishop.., together






195. Cf. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 326-27 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005) (order
denying motion to dismiss) (describing the statutory trust as an arrangement whereby the
bishop holds property only for the purposes of keeping it separate from his personal
interest).
196. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.030 (West 2005).
197. Id. § 24.12.010.
198. Melanie DiPietro, The Relevancy of Canon Law, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 399,
406 (2005) ("[C]anon law is relevant because it is incorporated by the state legislature in
the statutory language creating a corporate sole.").
199. Id.
200. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-52-103 (2004) (stating that a corporation sole may
"perform all other acts in furtherance of the objects and purposes of the corporation sole
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Consistent with the statutory mandate, an administrator of Church
property is duty-bound under canon law to act as "good householder. '"201
Canon law scholars have likened these duties to those governing a civil-202 203
law trust12 and compared the steward of Church property to a trustee.
Additionally, all valid transfers of Church property must adhere to theS • 204
Church's canon law requirements on alienation. This is especially vital
for public juridic persons, whose ownership and administration of
ecclesiastical goods is protected by the universal Church.20 5  Finally,
public juridic persons are canonically endowed to pursue their pious and
not inconsistent with the statutes of [the] state"). Articles of corporation further limit the
corporate powers of a corporation sole. See supra note 45.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
202. See, e.g., ADAM J. MAIDA & NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, CHURCH PROPERTY,
CHURCH FINANCES, AND CHURCH-RELATED CORPORATIONS 56 (1984). Cardinal
Maida and Professor Cafardi explain:
[This] duty attaches to the assets, as the canon law perceives them, of the public
juridic person in much the same way that the res or corpus of a civil law trust ...
carries with it the obligation of the civil law trust. These assets are so marked, so
dedicated by the public juridic person [because of the] person's prior acceptance
of the Church's teaching authority.
Id. (citation omitted). Good householders must also "protect [the juridic person's]
existence, provide for its longterm [sic] well-being," and observe canonical procedures. Id.
at 58. These duties also carry a faith dimension to them, further encouraging obedience.
See id. at 65 ("Although the importance of canonical accountability cannot be denied, it
pales in comparison to these duties that the canonical steward has in conscience to the
Lord, his faithful, his servants, and his poor.").
203. See, e.g., id. at 62 ("A steward is one who stands in a confidential position, a
position of trust, toward the object of his or her stewardship. Human agents who act on
behalf of public juridic persons do so in a relationship of trust toward the juridic person.").
This canonically established relationship requires that "[piroperty held by the steward is
not the steward's own. It belongs to others, but the steward will hold, manage, and make
the best of it for the true owner" so that "stewardship connotes that one has been charged
by a higher authority to look after the affairs of someone who cannot do so for himself or
herself." Id.
204. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 65-66, 70, 75, 78-81 and accompanying text. The Pontifical
Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts explains that this ownership "is
conditioned and justified by their destination for the accomplishment of the mission of the
Church and, in that sense, is subject to the administrative controls established by canonical
legislation." Affidavit of Nicholas P. Cafardi Exhibit D, supra note 45, at 2. Yet
ownership remains exclusively that of the individual public juridic person. Id. In
describing this distinction, the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative
Texts elaborates:
The necessity of greater control is determined from the nature of the
ecclesiastical goods itself [sic] and from their public character and thus should
not be conceived as a limitation of the autonomy of the entities but as a
guarantee of that autonomy, also in respect to eventual conflicts of interest
between the entity and the one who acts in its name.
Id. at 3.
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charitable ends through this ownership.06 Ardent protection of this
property aims not only to guard against civil actors, but Church actors as
well. 2°7 Were a diocese to snatch parish properties to satisfy the diocese's
debts, it would almost certainly precipitate parishes' enforcement of their
canonical rights within the Church."0
Despite the explicit statutory recognition of a diocese's relationship
with its parishes, a corporation sole is an imperfect representation of that
relationship.2 9  Unlike what one would expect under other corporate
forms of organization,2 0 "[p]arishes do not exist as 'profit centers' for the
Diocese."2 " ' Instead, parishes fund diocesan-wide services that facilitate
206. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. A juridic person resembles "a civil-
law corporation [because] it is a legal construct which can and must be conceived of apart
from the natural persons who constitute it, administer it, or for whose benefit it exists."
Robert T. Kennedy, Juridic Persons, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON
LAW, supra note 75, at 154, 155. Just as a civil corporation requires the drafting of articles
of incorporation and bylaws, so a juridic person requires the drafting and ratification of
statutes to govern it. Id. at 157.
207. Robert T. Kennedy, The Temporal Goods of the Church, in NEW COMMENTARY
ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 75, at 1451, 1457 ("[P]roperty legitimately
acquired by a parish-which, by law, is a juridic person-is owned by the parish, not by
the diocese, which is a distinct juridic person." (citation omitted)); Kennedy, supra note
206, at 154 (observing that juridic persons possess "the right to own property, the right to
enter into contracts, and the right to sue"). Juridic persons who find their rights adversely
affected, within or outside the Church, must vindicate them. See supra notes 73-74, 202
and accompanying text (describing the duties attendant to the stewardship of Church
property); see also 1983 CODE c.1282 ("All clerics or lay persons who through a legitimate
title take part in the administration of ecclesiastical goods are bound to fulfill their duties
in the name of the Church and in accord with the norm of law.").
208. See supra notes 70-75, 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing the rights and
remedies that accrue from juridic ownership of property). In the Boston Archdiocese,
these challenges have already materialized. See Vatican Bars Boston Archdiocese Seizure
of Parish Assets, CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.cwnews.com/news/
viewstory.cfm?recnum=38964 (relating that parishioners have successfully lodged
canonical protests against the Boston Archdiocese's unilateral acquisition of assets from
parishes it closes). According to the Congregation for the Clergy at the Vatican, the assets
of a closed parish do not automatically become the property of the Archdiocese. See id.
Instead, property of the closed parish becomes property of the new parish into which the
old one was merged. See id. For the Archdiocese to claim assets of the old parish, the
Archdiocese must obtain permission from the pastor and parish finance council. See id.
209. See supra note 22.
210. See Catholic Bishop of Spokane's Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to
Tort Litigant Committee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 31, Committee of
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane),
Case No. 04-08822-PCWI1, Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. May 27, 2005)
("Underlying the Litigant[s'] position is the mistaken notion that the Catholic Church and
General Motors have the same corporate governance structures and theories of liability
apply equally to organizations that feed souls and make cars.").
211. See Affidavit of William S. Skylstad, supra note 22, at 20.
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the parishes' mission.212  Moreover, it is a false comparison to other
corporate organizations to insist that there is a chain of command from
the Pope to pastor.2 " Though there are arguments that the diocese has
newly discovered this trust relationship to defend itself in litigation,214
dioceses organized as corporations sole have long relied on the
availability of statutory trusts created by state corporation sole statutes.2 5
Indeed, the requisites for a trust do not require as demanding a
showing of evidence as has been contended.2 6 At a minimum, assuming
the satisfaction of the other elements of a trust, the proffer of an
"external expression of intention" obviates need for an ironclad
documentation of the trust relationship.2 7  Yet when a diocese
incorporates pursuant to a corporation sole statute, one would expect
less skepticism because statutory trusts, in the acts themselves, make
evident the existence of the trusts.21 8  Where the trust is defined by
statute, the trust comes into being at the legislative will. 219  Such




213. Id. at 30.
214. See Committee of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 180, at 11 ("If the Diocese's
trust theory is correct, the Diocese can injure people and damage property, and simply
walk away claiming that it is judgment proof because its property is held in trust for the
Catholic Church.").
215. Cf supra text accompanying notes 37-40, 45.
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See supra text accompanying note 50. Moreover, a diocese could look to extrinsic
evidence where the existence of the trust relationship is in doubt. See supra text
accompanying note 51.
218. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 61-62 (1990) (finding that statutory language
supported the Court's view that a trust was created for the benefit of the IRS); State ex rel.
Trenholm v. Yelle, 25 P.2d 569, 570 (Wash. 1933) ("By the act itself, the fund is impressed
with a trust.").
219. See BOGERT supra note 46 and accompanying text; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.52.010 (2005) ("All moneys collected by any employer from his or its employees
and all money to be paid by any employer as his contribution for furnishing, either
directly, or through contract, or arrangement ... or any or all of the above enumerated
services, or any other necessary service, contingent upon sickness, accident or death, are
hereby declared to be a trust fund for the purposes for which the same are collected.").
220. See Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063,
1075-76 (2002) ("Because the bulk of nonbankruptcy law is state law, the Code expressly
and impliedly depends on state law. Thus, the Code specifically embraces the federalism
of our system of government. As a matter of statutory command, federal courts must in
many instances follow and apply state law."). This dependence is especially acute with
respect to § 541(a)'s "'interests of the debtor in property"' and § 541(d)'s "legal and
equitable interests" because both provisions are defined by state law, not bankruptcy law.
See id. at 1072-74.
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Statutory trusts are not easily evaded."' As a preliminary matter, the
222trust exists because of an explicit, statutory directive. Easy though it
may be to plot the various trust relationships according to one's own
observations, 2' a plain reading of the statutory trust reveals the proper
relationship. 214 Once the statutory trust is defined, there is no condition
that the trust property must remain segregated merely for the ease of
defining the bankruptcy estate. 25 Before a trust is excludable from the
bankruptcy estate, it does not have to meet conditions that are not
imposed by law; indeed, trusts have been excluded from the bankruptcy
estate even though they were not declared trusts before bankruptcy
litigation.226 Surely, then, § 541(d) excludes statutory trusts from the
227bankruptcy estate. In the case of a statutory trust created by a
corporation sole statute, the relationship between a diocese and parishes
is informed by the statutory scheme itself when it declares that the trust
exists "in conformity" with or "in furtherance" of the Church. 2
221. See, e.g., Begier, 496 U.S. at 60 (1990) (noting that the trust of funds is created
once "collecting" occurs without any need for sending them to the IRS or segregating
them).
222. See BOGERT supra note 46 and accompanying text.
223. See Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 326 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005) (order denying
motion to dismiss) ("[Washington's corporate sole statute] does not designate any
particular beneficiary but merely identifies the nature or character of the possible
beneficiaries. The beneficiary must be a religious organization. The statute does not
establish a trust for any specific religious organization or for a congregation or a synod or
parish or any component or subgroup or member of any religious organization."); see also
John Stucke, Fate of Diocese Could Rest on Property Ruling, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
(Spokane, Wash.), June 28, 2005, at 1B 2005 WLNR 10285343 (quoting Judge Williams as
saying, "It sure sounds to me like the diocese is the beneficiary of the trust").
224. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 187-197.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 111-112. The Supreme Court in Begier
remarked on the shortcoming inherent to implying a segregation prerequisite in a
statutory trust: a trustee's refusal to segregate would avoid creating the trust. Begier, 496
U.S. at 61.
226. See, e.g., In re Poffenbarger, 281 B.R. 379, 390 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002) (agreeing
with several other courts that a trust for child support funds exists for the purposes of
excluding them from the debtor's bankruptcy estate); Martinson v. James (In re James),
186 BR. 262, 266 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (finding that "no formal trust entity" is
necessary where the requirements of a non-business trust are otherwise met); Gabelhart v.
Gabelhart (In re The Carriage House, Inc.), 146 B.R. 352, 357 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1992)
(holding that a trust, though lacking proper characterization as a private or business trust
under Vermont law, is still "something" of an "'entity"' entitled to classification as a trust
under the Bankruptcy Code).
227. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2000); see also supra Part I.D.2.b.
228. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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B. Ceding No Ground to State-Sponsored Religious Discrimination
One scholar has noted that although the Supreme Court uses broad
language to protect religious liberty, it actually upholds relatively few
free-exercise rights. 22' A successful free-exercise challenge, therefore, is
not founded on an articulation of the burden on religious beliefs in theS 230
face of an important state interest. Rather, Smith and its progeny
require that free-exercise claimants convince a court that an intentional
discrimination against religion has occurred.3  Moreover, a proper
understanding of the religious activity at issue should be thoroughly
characterized,232 thereby avoiding a judicial gloss that comes dangerously
233close to violating the First Amendment. Although the central tenet of
the First Amendment is that religious discrimination is forbidden, the
Supreme Court will uphold a legal "distinction" unless it fails to bear
rational relation to the goals it pursues.2 3
229. Robert A. Destro, Developments in Liability Theories and Defenses, 37 CATH.
LAW. 83, 85-86 (1996). This does not mean that lower courts are unwilling to read
Supreme Court precedent generously to broaden free-exercise rights. See Douglas
Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding
the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 203 (2004) (acknowledging
ambiguities in interpreting Smith but concluding that "Lukumi and the trend of lower
court opinions read Smith in a way that provides substantial protection to religious
liberty").
230. See Destro, supra note 229, at 87 ("Counsel [in Smith] made a significant error by
failing to recognize that most parties raising free exercise claims lost whenever the state
was able to articulate an important state interest which supported the regulation of the
conduct at issue, and, somehow, counsel erroneously concluded that by arguing that the
religious interest was important enough to the individuals involved, they could win their
case."). The majority in Smith feared that if counsel's rule prevailed, it would "open the
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
888-89 (1990). In Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), the majority validated Professor
Destro's observation: "The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional
degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden
on Promise Scholars." Id. at 725.
231. Destro, supra note 229, at 94.
232. See id. at 104 ("Defense counsel should not permit opposing counsel, or the court,
to characterize religious conduct as secular without making a record which demonstrates
beyond cavil that the characterization is wrong.").
233. See id. at 104-05 ("Pastoral counseling and the Sacrament of Confession do not
become mere counseling by judicial fiat, nor does the canonical relationship between
priest and bishop become a simple agency relationship because there is some degree of
supervision. If the act of ordination is hiring and the laying-on of hands or baptism is
merely a touching, the neutral principles doctrine has ceased to function as a mechanism
to protect First Amendment rights. It has instead become a mechanism for permitting the
state to supervise the internal operations of the church.").
234. Id. at 94-95.
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An analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions in Locke v.
Davey21 5 is particularly helpful for understanding a "distinction" in the
bankrupt diocese context because they sharply differ between upholding
the state action and declaring it unconstitutional . Joshua Davey was
awarded a Promise Scholarship and after enrolling at an eligible
institution, attempted to use his scholarship to study devotional theology
despite such a prohibition under Washington State's law and
231constitution. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that "the State's disfavor of religion . . . is of a far milder kind" than
"requir[ing] students to choose between their religious beliefs and
receiving a government benefit., 23 s Washington State, thought also to be
"solicitous in ensuring that its constitution is not hostile toward
religion,, 239 merely continued the prohibitions against public funding for-• 240
the clergy that existed at the time of the nation's founding. According
to the majority, the "historic and substantial state interest at issue"
weighs in favor of the proscription's constitutionality. 4' In a vigorous
dissent, Justice Scalia accused the Court of excusing discrimination
because the majority concluded the discrimination was not motivated by
any religious animus.242  Justice Scalia framed the scenario as one in
which the state offered a public benefit but "withh[eld] that benefit from
some individuals solely on the basis of religion., 243 He opined that any
publicly available allowance "becomes part of the baseline against which
burdens on religion are measured."2 44  Davey sought only equal
treatment under the law, not "a special benefit to which others were not
entitled. ,245
235. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
236. Compare id. at 725 (holding for the majority that nothing in Washington's
constitution or in the Promise Scholarship Program's prohibition against devotional
theology study "suggests animus toward religion") with id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a religious minority.").
237. Id. at 715-17.
238. Id. at 720-21.
239. Id. at 724 n.8.
240. Cf id. at 722-23.
241. Id. at 725. The dissent criticizes the majority for deferring to a state interest that
amounts to "the State's opinion that it would violate taxpayers' freedom of conscience not
to discriminate against candidates for the ministry." Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia failed to see why legislative motive
mattered, writing: "If a State deprives a citizen of trial by jury or passes an ex post facto
law, we do not pause to investigate whether it was actually trying to accomplish the evil
the Constitution prohibits. It is sufficient that the citizen's rights have been infringed." Id.
243. Id. at 726-27.
244. Id. at 726.
245. Id. at 727.
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Locke may have upset the apple cart of government neutrality, but not
246
by much. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Locke has been criticized for its
departure from Lukumi because Washington State was relieved of
showing a compelling interest for its discrimination against religion.247
Locke's holding, however, should not be construed as an endorsement of
state-sponsored religious discrimination, especially in light of the limited
248facts on which the case rests. Although it is an important part of Smith-
Lukumi jurisprudence, Locke stands for the limited proposition that the
nondiscrimination scheme does not embrace discriminatory funding.248
Moreover, Locke is simply not broad enough to require that every free-
exercise claim include proof of an "anti-religious motive., 250  Smith-
Lukumi jurisprudence, unmodified by Locke except in its particularized
context, thus continues to control any evaluation of burdens to Free
Exercise by the state.2 1 ' Accordingly, a helpful restatement of Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence is: "The state . . . is free to regulate
conduct as long as it does not target religion for discriminatory
treatment. If the field of law involved are those . . . that are entirely
neutral in their general application, religious exemptions are not
constitutionally required.,
252
Free-exercise protection should apply everywhere, with no distinction
between the halls of the Hialeah City Council or the bankruptcy court in
246. See Laycock, supra note 229, at 218-19 ("The Court rejects the attempt to
transport Lukumi wholesale from the regulation cases to the funding cases. But it does
not rewrite the regulation cases.").
247. See, e.g., id. at 171 ("From the perspective of the Court's cases on discrimination
against religion, [Locke's holding] is remarkable. The Court had never before held that
the state can discriminate against religion."). Although it is not altogether clear in the
majority opinion, one could infer that the standard in Locke is one requiring a compelling
state interest. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 ("The State's interest in not funding the pursuit
of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively
minor burden on Promise Scholars.") (emphasis added); but cf id. at 730 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that "[t]he [majority] opinion is devoid of any mention of standard
of review").
248. Laycock, supra note 229, at 162.
249. Id. at 200. After Locke, funding has become an exception to the otherwise broad
protections afforded to religious liberty by Lukumi. See id. at 178 ("Funding is now an
exception to the rule of government neutrality toward religion.").
250. Id. at 214, 216-18. Professor Laycock recognizes that bad motive is evidence of
discrimination, but not a requirement for it. See id. at 210 ("Bad motive may be one way
to prove a violation, but first and foremost, Smith-Lukumi is about objectively unequal
treatment of religion and analogous secular activities.").
251. Id. 216-18 ("Davey's claim relied on Lukumi, the leading regulation case, but his
goal was to extend the Lukumi rules from regulation to funding. That effort failed;
Lukumi does not apply to funding. But neither was Lukumi rolled back as applied to
regulation.").
252. Destro, supra note 229, at 88 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Spokane.25' Nonetheless, great efforts are and have been made to limit
the Church's basic protections under the First Amendment; for example,
one attorney's opinion of the relevance of canon law is, "'If it's
inconsistent with the law of the land, it goes in the garbage can.' ' , 54 The
difficulty with such a shortsighted analysis is that the Federal Rules of
Evidence readily admit "[a]ll relevant evidence. 255 Evidence is relevant
if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence ... more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." '256 A federal judge has discretion to admit relevant
evidence; 251 when considering the admissibility of the evidence, the judge
is not subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence.258 When deciding the
admissibility of evidence, a federal judge, naturally, cannot avoid
compliance with the Constitution or congressional enactments.5 9 Thus,
the First Amendment matters as much to a bankruptcy proceeding as
does the determination of the bankruptcy estate under § 541.'60 Canon
law is further protected in that it can be neither interpreted nor
challenged by a court.26' The mistake of rejecting the testimony of five
262canon law experts doomed the Illinois Supreme Court in Serbian. The
uneasiness of a trial judge considering evidence on canon law sufficiently
263
impressed the appellate court in Catholic University of America.
253. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 728 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If the
Religion Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce them, in hard cases as well as easy
ones.").
254. Marie Beaudette, Churches Weigh Going Bankrupt to Escape Suits, LEGAL
TIMES (Wash., D.C.), July 26, 2004, at 1 (quoting David Slader, the plaintiffs' attorney in
Portland); see also Wendy N. Davis, Church and Chapter 11, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005, at 14, 16
(quoting Marci Hamilton, who represents plaintiffs in both Spokane and Portland, as
saying, "No American judge would take [canon law] as evidence").
255. See FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States [or] by Act of Congress .... ). The
Federal Rules of Evidence govern bankruptcy proceedings. FED. R. EVID. 101 ("These
rules govern proceedings in the courts of the United States and before the United States
bankruptcy judges ... ").
256. FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
257. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
258. See id.
259. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Having a civil court determine the merits of
canon law scholarship would be in violent opposition to the constitutional principle of the
separation of church and state.").
262. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States of Am. and Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 718 (1976).
263. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (relating
the trial judge's concern "that the line of inquiry was 'getting awful[ly] close to entangling
the government and the judiciary in religious matters"' and became problematic when he
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Accordingly, not only is evidence that is relevant to the determination of
the bankruptcy estate admissible, but no constitutional rights may be
infringed during that determination.
Plaintiffs have argued that the inclusion of parish properties in the
bankruptcy estate of a diocese organized as a corporation sole does not
implicate the First Amendment because secular, tortious conduct is what
is at issue, and therefore no free-exercise freedoms attach.265 Proponents
of this view-though correct in their initial analysis that a diocesan
bankruptcy "is a purely secular dispute between creditors and a
bankruptcy debtor, albeit one which is a religious organization" 266-are
mistaken when they subsequently characterize the Church's position as
an attempt to govern ordinary civil law by internal ecclesiastical
267
doctrine. Plaintiffs' attorneys protest too much when they argue that
Wolf applies instead of Serbian, sounding as if plaintiffs have conceded
that the matter before the court is an "intra-church dispute. 2 68
It is true that the Supreme Court has never explicitly extended church
autonomy reasoning outside the intrachurch context. 69 This does not
270
mean that the church autonomy cases cannot inform the discussion.
On the one hand, the Court has sketched an upper boundary where
controversies arising in church tribunals about real or personal property
heard "'aggressive examination of a priest about what is at least partly his clerical duties"')
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Nov. 4, 1993 Trial Transcript at 9-10,
Nov. 5, 1993 Trial Transcript at 147).
264. See supra notes 255, 259 and accompanying text.
265. See Committee of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 180, at 24-25.
266. See, e.g., Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 323 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005) (order
denying motion to dismiss).
267. See, e.g., id. at 325 ("This argument by the debtor and the defendants is in essence
a request to impose internal ecclesiastical rules upon third parties who deal with the
debtor in secular transactions.").
268. See, e.g., Catholic Bishop of Spokane's Memorandum of Authorities in
Opposition to Tort Litigant Committee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 210, at 39-41 (reasoning that the Committee's attempt to persuade the court to
consider neutral principles of law instead of deference has conceded the notion that the
estate property issue "in substance and reality is an intra-church dispute").
269. See Marianne Perciaccante, Note, The Courts and Canon Law, 6 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 171, 171 (1996); see also Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 514-15 (classifying
free-exercise cases before the Supreme Court into intrachurch and non-intrachurch
disputes); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (referring to these cases as
"internal problems of religious bodies").
270. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Cases of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373, 1397 (1981) ("The [Supreme] Court has consistently extended the right of church
autonomy as far as necessary to include the cases before it.").
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could "in no sense depend on ecclesiastical questions." '271 On the other
hand, the Court has also observed that "[s]pecial problems arise.., when
[property] disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine," but
without identifying the limits on those special problems.2 In General
Council on Finance & Administration, United Methodist Church v.
California Superior Court,27' an authority upon which proponents of a
circumscribed reading of church autonomy cases rely, 74 Justice
Rehnquist did not articulate a position adopted by the whole Court.275
Moreover, he did not illuminate the field between what is essentially
religious and what is purely secular.276 More recently, federal circuit
court opinions have also loosely articulated the limits of church. • • 177
autonomy jurisprudence. In keeping with this imprecision, some state
271courts have been even less circumspect than federal courts of appeals.
271. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,733 (1872).
272. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969). The Court refused to elaborate, writing instead, "The
logic of this language leaves the civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical questions
in the process of resolving property disputes." Id. at 447.
273. 439 U.S. 1369 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978).
274. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 265. Then Justice Rehnquist's opinion
held:
There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil court may
inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in
adjudicating intrachurch disputes. But this Court never has suggested that those
constraints similarly apply outside the context of such intraorganization disputes.
Thus, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese and the other cases cited by applicant
are not in point. Those cases are premised on a perceived danger that in
resolving intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in essentially
religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular
doctrinal beliefs. Such considerations are not applicable to purely secular
disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religious
affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach of contract, and statutory
violations are alleged.
Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin., 439 U.S. at 1372-73 (citations omitted).
275. See id. at 1374.
276. See id. at 1372-73.
277. See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299,
1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the court's decision "only continues a long-standing
tradition that churches are to be free from government interference in matters of church
governance and administration"); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) ("'[T]he Free Exercise Clause precludes governmental interference with
ecclesiastical hierarchies ....') (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Minker
v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir.
1990)).
278. See Perciaccante, supra note 269, at 173 (analyzing the interpretations of canon
law by state courts in non-intrachurch contexts). Those cases include:
[A] bishop's vicarious liability for a priest's tortious actions; ownership of a
deceased monk's property when that monk has taken a vow of poverty; necessity
[Vol. 55:583
Separation of Church and Estate
Some jurists have suggested that relieving courts of rigid limitations on
free exercise is not unwelcome.279
Perhaps the reluctance to extend church autonomy jurisprudence to
diocesan bankruptcies is that the judicial result would be a foregone
conclusion.2 ° Under either the church autonomy or neutral principles
approach, the bankrupt diocese could win.8 Were a court to defer to
church polity, the Church's position is unmistakably clear: given notions
of juridic persons, the nature of ecclesiastical goods, duties of a good
householder, restrictions on alienation, and canonical remedies for
violations of canon law, a diocese is without canonical authority to
282
include a parish in its bankruptcy estate. Perhaps sensing this
conclusion, attorneys who seek inclusion of parish assets in a diocesan
bankruptcy estate instead prefer an analysis of neutral principles of
law.283 Sitting in "purely secular" judgment of the Church, Wolf requires
of payment of federal income taxes when the priest or nun employee has taken a
vow of poverty; ownership of church property in an action for trespassing; and
the secular legal validity of an antenuptial agreement requiring that a couple
raise their children Catholic.
Id.
279. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 100
(Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting) ("The logic of [the ministerial exception and church
autonomy] cases suggests that the constitutionally protected space for religious
organizations is actually broader than these obvious categories. In short, the ministerial
exception and the church autonomy doctrine are ways of describing spheres of
constitutionally required protection, but these categories are not exhaustive."). Justice
Brown further suggested that "[i]nstead of applying Smith, we might view it as effectively
returning free exercises questions to the states." Id. at 107.
280. See MAIDA & CAFARDI, supra note 202, at 109. Cardinal Maida and Professor
Cafardi explain:
It can still be expected that on such internal matters as Church discipline, faith,
internal organization and ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law, Serbian's
nonreviewable, or deferential, approach will be the case and church judicatories
will be granted constitutional protection on such matters. In other words, on
matters of internal polity, courts will allow church law to be final.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Greenawalt, supra note 269, at 1865 (finding that a neutral
principles of law analysis of church documents facilitates deference by a court); cf. id. at
1902 (suggesting that the law is more predictable for the "rigorously hierarchical [] Roman
Catholic Church" than for some other religious groups); Francis Helminski, Neutral-
Principles and Triumphant Hierarchies: Trusts of Property in the Episcopal Church, in THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY 25, 25, 45 (Joseph Fox ed., 2001) ("Using the
hierarchical approach, of course, means the diocese will win.").
281. Cf Helminski, supra note 280, at 45.
282. See supra Part I.C.
283. Cf. Committee of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 180, at 24. Dioceses do not
always need to fear the use of neutral principles of law. See Helminski, supra note 280, at
45 ("[U]sing the neutral-principles analysis does not necessarily mean the diocese will
lose.").
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only that a court is "not to rely on religious precepts in determining
whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create
a trust."2 4  But the documents for review would include articles of
incorporation and "state statutes governing the holding of church
property, 28 5 as well as "provisions in the constitution of the general
church concerning the ownership and control of church property., 286 A
"secular" reading of the documents directed by Wolf still supports the
conclusion that a trustee-diocese cannot include beneficiary-parish in its
287bankruptcy estate.
Intrachurch analyses for resolving secular disputes with third parties
are useful still because they have become prevalent as courts have
expanded the use of the neutral principles of law analysis. Courts use
the neutral principles of law analysis to garner jurisdiction in civil matters
over essentially religious activity.289 What results is an abuse of the
neutral principles of law approach, which rather than defining the limits
of a court's jurisdiction, becomes the basis for resolving the controversy
itself.29° If courts continue to insist on employing the neutral principles of
law approach to separate religious and secular activities in disputes with
parties not governed by intrachurch doctrine, the court should at least
base its separation on: "1) the intent of the [religious] parties; 2) the
character and setting of their relationship; and 3) the content of the
evidence necessary to establish the claims and defenses in the case."'2 91
Without recourse to these factors, a court almost certainly will
mischaracterize religious conduct as secular to the further detriment of a
faithful observation of the neutral principles of law.292
Some courts that have confronted the separation of religious conduct
from secular conduct have remarked on Smith's applicability to
individuals but not to churches, thereby preserving the essence of church
293autonomy rationales. Church autonomy cases, like Smith, essentially
revolve around the judiciary's unwillingness to inquire into religious
tenets.29 The fears relayed in Smith about assessing religious belief areheightened when a court must address, among competing parties, the
284. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
285. Id. at 602-03.
286. Id. at 603.
287. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text, supra Part I.C.
288. Cf Destro, supra note 229, at 102-04 (discussing civil courts' increasing use of
neutral principles of law to separate "'secular"' activities from "'religious"' ones).
289. See id.
290. See id. at 102-05 (describing the flawed outcome that ensues).
291. See id. at 104.
292. Id. at 104-05.
293. See supra Parts I.E.2, I.E.4.
294. Greenawalt, supra note 269, at 1906.
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ownership of church property which relies in part on free-exercise
claims.29' Accordingly, any post-Smith authority that upholds church
autonomy rationales is enhanced because these rationales remain faithful
to the heart of Smith's message; they "avoid[] for the most part judicial
assessment of religious matters" and maintain "the Court's proclivities
towards not having special constitutional rights for religious claimants.,
296
Above and beyond any religious claimant's expectation that it can rely
on Smith-Lukumi's guarantee of the neutral enforcement of a generally
applicable law,2 9 ' RFRA further insulates claimants from federal lawsthatsubtantall buren . • 298
that substantially burden religion. The legal reality of RFRA's viability
in the federal realm has its opponents.299 Critics argue that RFRA is ultra
vires because there is no enumeration of an "Article I power [to] justif[y
295. See id.
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 229-34, 249-52 and accompanying text (discussing Smith-Lukumi
jurisprudence).
298. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text (explaining RFRA's continued
applicability with respect to federal law); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 n.2
(2005) (acknowledging that RFRA remains constitutional in the federal sphere).
299. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("In my opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a 'law
respecting an establishment of religion' that violates the First Amendment to the
Constitution."). Justice Stevens decries "governmental preference for religion, as opposed
to irreligion" through "a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain." Id. at 537.
See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,
Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 1 (1998) (insisting that Boerne was "straightforward"
about RFRA's unconstitutionality under both state and federal law). Professor Hamilton
believes that the enactment of RFRA proceeded from "manifest disrespect for the
Supreme Court as an institution, and has done so in the most unsubtle fashion
imaginable." Id. at 5. Professor Hamilton quotes James Madison at length in defense of
her proposition that government and religious collaboration is dangerous. See id. at 10
n.50 ("'Religion itself may become a motive to persecution & oppression."') (quoting
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1787)). What Madison would think of
RFRA is unknown, but, at the very least, he championed government that was sensitive to
burdens on religion. See JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in GREAT QUOTATIONS ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM app. 2, at 209, 210 (Albert J. Menendez & Edd Doerr eds., Prometheus Books
2002) (1785). Madison wrote:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be
considered as a subject of the Governour of the Universe: And if a member of
Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it
with a reservation of his duty to the General Authority; much more must every
man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of
his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters
of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
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RFRA's] application to federal law., 3'0  According to this criticism,
recourse to the Necessary and Proper Clause is insufficient. 1 Critics also
condemn what they see as a usurpation of the Supreme Court's province
to "say what the law is, ' 30 a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.39
United States Courts of Appeals have disagreed with these
contentions. 304  Even Boerne suggests that congressional authority to
apply RFRA to federal law is well founded. It is imperative, therefore,
that the separation of powers argument is read "in the context of the
entire opinion and the question being considered," namely, RFRA's• 306
application to state laws. Thus there is practically no obstacle to
RFRA's falling within "Congress' power to apply RFRA to the federal
government . . . [under] its Article I powers. 3 7  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has recognized Congress' authority to legislate beyond
the liberties guaranteed by the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution. 30" This authority does not diminish when bankruptcy is the
federal law Congress modifies through RFRA.3 9  Undeniably one of
Congress' enumerated powers allows it to fashion law on bankruptcies,
so there is less reason to rely solely on the Necessary and Proper
Clause-the so-called "last, best hope.,
310
300. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 299, at 14.
301. See id. at 16 (emphasizing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is "'the last, best
hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action"') (quoting Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997)).
302. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); Hamilton, supra note 299,
at 2-8.
303. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 299, at 2-8.
304. See e.g., Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v.
Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 859-61 (8th Cir. 1998).
305. Cf. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-35 ("When Congress acts within its sphere of power
and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution. This has been clear from the
early days of the Republic.").
306. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 959.
307. Id.
308. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 860 (enumerating instances of legislation beyond the
Supreme Court's minimum protections). The Eighth Circuit further noted that there is no
condition that Congress and the Supreme Court must agree "in order for its legislation to
pass constitutional muster." Id.
309. Id. at 860-61. The Eighth Circuit concluded that "RFRA is an appropriate means
by Congress to modify the United States bankruptcy laws." Id. at 861.
310. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997); see supra notes 149-53 and
accompanying text.
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III. THE READING OF STATE AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS AS NEUTRAL
LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY EXCLUDES PARISH PROPERTY
FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
There are some demands for justice that cannot be met by even the
most cooperative bankrupt diocese. In litigation where so much money
is at stake, the Church-like any other citizen or corporation-is entitled
to pursue a defense.3 2 Perhaps entitlement to defend oneself is lost on
those who accuse the Church of perpetrating a fraud through bankruptcy
laws."3 Detractors dismiss the Church for a variety of reasons, one of
which is its failure to entertain a utilitarian calculus-seemingly, greater
good can come from ransoming diocesan debts with parish property.
31 4
In reality, there is nothing dilatory, deceptive, or unrealistic about the
arguments the Church makes: unquestionably, a diocese organized as a
corporation sole has legitimate arrows in its quiver to protect parish
assets from inclusion in the diocese's bankruptcy estate. Dioceses have
long acted under the auspices of the state to keep parish property in
trust.315 Bankruptcy law automatically excludes from the debtor's estate
316any property held in a statutory trust. Any deviant application of
neutral bankruptcy and state laws of general applicability requires a
compelling interest narrowly tailored to achieve that deviant
application's purpose.3 7  If the state fails to guarantee the equal
application of the laws, and does not have a compelling interest that
justifies its discriminatory application of the laws, the state is engaging in
forbidden discrimination against religion.1
Independent of canon law, statutory language requiring property to be
held "in trust" directs a corporation sole to hold its property for "for the
use, purpose, benefit and behoof" of other persons within the Church. 19
311. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing lawsuits so large that a
handful would financially destroy the entire diocese).
312. See supra notes 30-31 (detailing the fiscal threat of lawsuits brought by
uncompromising plaintiffs).
313. See supra note 31.
314. See, e.g., Committee of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Authorities in Response
to Oppositions and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 24, Comm. of Tort Litigants
v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane), Case No. 04-
08822-PCW11, Adv. Case. No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. June 13, 2005) ("The very
worst that can be said is that a few parishioners will be disappointed if the Diocese is
required to pay its debts.").
315. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
316. See supra Part I.D.2.a-b.
317. See supra notes 117-20, 134 and accompanying text.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 115, 120, 134-36136.
319. See supra Part I.A. Even though some diocesan property exists for the benefit of
parishes, see supra note 211-12 and accompanying text, bankrupt dioceses have made
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That use, purpose, benefit, or behoof is not defined by a court or by an
overzealous attorney.320 At legislative behest,32' the contours of the
statutory trust become defined by canon law, a stricter norm than a
322
garden-variety fiduciary duty familiar to other trusts. Opponents
dismiss this construction, choosing instead to cast the decision to
incorporate under a corporation sole statute as an ignoble power grab.323
The history behind corporation sole statutes is irrelevant to the
324obligation to interpret the statute as written. Where statutory language
much diocesan property available to the bankruptcy estates. See, e.g., Catholic Bishop of
Spokane's Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to Tort Litigant Committee's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 210, at 47 (detailing Spokane's effort to
cooperate by making available $25 million in undisputed diocesan assets and insurance).
320. But see Comm. of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Authorities in Response to
Oppositions and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 314, at 22. Plaintiffs'
attorneys reason:
The payment of damages to the survivors of this abuse, who once were the
children of this Diocese, is an appropriate use of the corporation's property and
is part of fulfilling the Diocese's self-professed purpose to compensate the
survivors. In purely legalistic terms, reduction of the Diocese's liability is for the
benefit and behoof of the Diocese and the Roman Catholic Church in the
Diocese of Spokane. In moral terms, it is a necessity.
Id.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 53.
322. See supra Parts I.C, II.A.
323. See, e.g., Reply Brief by Mr. Shea and Brief in Opposition to Motion of Diocese
for Summary Judgment, supra note 31, at 3; Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese
of Spokane (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 326 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
Aug. 26, 2005) (order denying motion to dismiss). The bankruptcy court in Spokane
resorted to extrinsic evidence to determine the plain meaning of the statute, namely,
historical accounts of why a statutory trust was created in the first place. Id. at 326-27. If
courts are willing to depart from the plain statutory language, it is unfair that they refuse
to acknowledge the diocese's own understanding of the trust as evinced by articles of
incorporation, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, and, more significantly, abundant
canonical corroboration, see supra Part I.C; see also MAIDA & CAFARDI, supra note 202,
at 103-04 (1984). Cardinal Maida and Professor Cafardi believe that:
[t]here is reason to manifest a justifiable pride in the canon law. It is the oldest,
continually functioning legal system in the world. The next oldest legal system,
which is our own Anglo-American common law system, is younger by a good 800
to 1,000 years. The common law had its genesis in the canon law, and the canon
law was the means by which many concepts of Roman law (e.g., corporations)
entered the common law. When William the Conqueror invaded England from
Normandy, he brought with him his first chancellor, Maurice, who was a cleric
and canon lawyer. In establishing the legal system for the conquered territories,
he made use of the canonical and Roman legal concepts with which he was
familiar as a canon lawyer. The common law has developed from this system.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
324. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Wash. State Coal. for the
Homeless v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 949 P.2d 1291, 1297 (Wash. 1997) ("The duty
of the court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and
purpose of the Legislature, as expressed in the statute as a whole. If a statute is
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requires a trust, canon law is a useful and necessary instrument,
describing with specificity enforceable duties.325
A duty required under the statutory trust is that the diocese act "in
conformity with the constitution, canons, rules, regulations or disciplines
of such church or denomination 26 or "in furtherance of the objects and
purposes of the corporation.",121 When canon law is brought to bear on a
corporation sole's treatment of property, there are rights, duties, and
remedies of canon law that rush in to define the relationship of dioceses
and parishes.32 ' That relationship-announcing the enforceable right of
each juridic person to possess and protect its own property and further
instructing each administrator of property to observe strict fiduciary
duties-can only lead to the conclusion that property must be held in
trust when the property of one juridic person is owned civilly by another
juridic person.329 The authentic interpretation of this section of canon
law by the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts,
the Church authority on canon law, confirms this understanding.330
If state law is settled as to the existence of the statutory trust, it is
331automatically incorporated into bankruptcy law. Only where there is a
supervening federal interest will state law not control,332 but the laws on
bankruptcy do not evince any such federal interest that trumps state
property law.333 In fact, through RFRA, Congress articulated a large
federal interest in avoiding substantial burdens to religion.3 Further
federal guidance is provided by Begier, wherein the Supreme Court
upbraided an attempt to dismiss the existence of a statutory trust.335
unambiguous, its meaning is to be derived from the language of the statute alone. An
unambiguous statute is not subject to judicial construction, and [a court] will not add
language to a clear statute even if [it] believe[s] the Legislature intended something else
but failed to express it adequately.") (citations omitted).
325. See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text (describing both state and
canonical requirements for administering a statutory trust).
326. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.010 (West 2005).
327. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-52-103 (West 2004); see also supra note 43 and
accompanying text (describing other similar state statutes).
328. See supra Part I.C.
329. See supra Part I.C.
330. See supra Part I.C and note 205.
331. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. It could be said further that
because bankruptcy law incorporates state law, and state law incorporates canon law,
bankruptcy law also incorporates canon law. See id.
332. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
333. Cf. supra note 220 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 140, 147-53, 298 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part I.D.2.b.
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When a statutory trust is found, § 541(d) plainly excludes it from the
336bankruptcy estate.
To misapply state law and bankruptcy law to achieve a different result
than one that would flow from the neutral application of a generally
applicable law discriminates against a bankrupt diocese's free-exercise
rights. 37  The relationship of dioceses and parishes is, by plaintiffs'
attorneys' own admissions, the "very heart" of bankruptcy litigation.338
Bankruptcy courts may not sacrifice the free-exercise rights of debtor
dioceses on the altar of advancing recovery from tortious conduct.3391 40
Although bankruptcy courts may weigh creditors' rights in its analysis,
religious discrimination by a state requires more than a minor state
interest such as creditor satisfaction.34' Indeed, a determination of the
bankruptcy estate precedes any discussion of creditors' equitable
rights.342 In the end, any departure from neutrally applying generally
applicable state and federal laws must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest.343 This holds true under either Smith-Lukumi or
RFRA.34
Critics, ignoring the importance of Smith-Lukumi's bearing on the
determination of a diocese's bankruptcy estate, expect that RFRA
portends the great challenge to concluding that there are no First
336. Cf. supra Part I.D.2.b.
337. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 252, 260.
338. Committee of Tort Litigants' Opposition to Defendant Parishes' Motion to
Dismiss at 2, Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane (In re The Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), No. 04-08822-PCW11, Adv. Case No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
May 26, 2005) ("The question of [parishes'] relationship to the Diocese is at the very heart
of the Complaint as the Court determines what is property of the estate.").
339. See, e.g., Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 325 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005) (order
denying motion to dismiss) ("The majority of claims in this bankruptcy proceeding are
based upon personal injuries suffered as a result of sex abuse by members of the clergy.
One is a personal injury claim arising from negligence, not sex abuse.").
340. See id. at 332 ("[A] Bankruptcy Court must balance not just the equities between
the entity which holds legal title to the property against the entity which holds the
beneficial interest, but those interests against the equities in favor of the creditors.").
341. Cf. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 730 n.2 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If
religious discrimination required only a rational basis, the Free Exercise Clause would
impose no constraints other than those the Constitution already imposes on all
government action.").
342. See, e.g., In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 325 ("Fair and
equitable treatment of all creditors requires application of civil law not only to determine
their rights to recover from assets of the debtor, but to first define the interest of the
debtor in those assets.").
343. See supra notes 140, 151-53, 251-52 and accompanying text.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 140, 251-52.
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Amendment violations involved.3 45  However, RFRA is still a valid
346
means of promulgating and clarifying bankruptcy law. Whether
Congress amends § 541 specifically to ensure that it complies with a
showing of compelling government interest, or amends § 541 through
RFRA, congressional power to act is not impaired. 347 Through RFRA,
Congress has expressed a concern for substantial burdens to free• 348
exercise. In re Young found a substantial burden by including in the
bankruptcy estate thirteen thousand dollars in tithes that debtors claimed
no longer belonged to them.3 49 By any measurement, the burden would
be much more substantial where a bankrupt diocese would be forced to
turn over several hundred million dollars in parish properties that it
argues does not belong to it.35° Civil lawsuits are only one burden for a
bankrupt diocese; canonical proceedings will also arise out of this kind of
bankruptcy litigation.' Moreover, this observation of canon law-
millennial in maturity and universal in scope-is at least as entitled to a
consideration under RFRA as is the right of a prison inmate to cast
spells.3 2 The compelling government interest that is required under both
constitutional and statutory laws must amount to more than the
maximization of the debtor's estate.
345. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, Did the Portland Catholic Archdiocese Declare
Bankruptcy to Avoid or Delay Clergy Abuse Suits?, FINDLAw'S LEGAL COMMENT, July
13, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20040713.html ("RFRA ... would permit
[the Church] to take advantage of the Chapter 11 procedures it likes while it resists the
portions it does not like. And even if the Church ultimately loses such arguments-as it
should-it will doubtless succeed, at least, in interposing tremendous delay.").
346. See supra notes 151-53, 298 and accompanying text.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 146-153; see also United States v. Marengo
County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1562 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[C]ongressional disapproval of a
Supreme Court decision does not impair the power of Congress to legislate a different
result, as long as Congress had that power in the first place.").
348. See supra note 140. Commentators who could be considered hostile to a
bankrupt diocese's legal position have at least recognized that it is desirable to defer to a
legislature's explicit enunciation of religious burdens to particular laws. See, e.g., Marci A.
Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1099, 1174 ("[E]xemptions are the task of the legislatures, which have the
institutional capacity to consider whether exempting religious institutions burdened by
particular laws is consistent with the public good."). Cf Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (encouraging legislatures to take the lead
in crafting religious protections).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 147-153.
350. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
352. See O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 400-01 (7th Cir. 2003) ("We
cannot tell whether a limit on casting spells would 'substantially' burden O'Bryan's
religious activities .... Thus it is premature to apply the RFRA's standard to O'Bryan's
claims; that is a task for the district court in the first instance, and on a suitable record.").
353. See cases cited supra notes 117, 153.
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Undeniably, the First Amendment does not protect tortious conduct,
but tortious conduct is not at issue in a bankruptcy court's determination
of the extent of a debtor's estate.355 By defending this truism, a debtor-
diocese is not shirking its liability by arguing that the bankruptcy estate is
more limited than plaintiffs would like, despite what plaintiffs' attorneys
believe. Rather than swallowing as much as possible into the
bankruptcy estate, the grand goals of Chapter 11 should be to allow a
debtor to recover from bankruptcy and satisfy creditors. 357  Bishops'
statements documenting their decision to file for bankruptcy evince an
earnest desire to satisfy creditors, within the limits of justice and fairness
to past, present, and future victims and to the diocese itself.358 However,
plaintiffs demand enlargement of the bankruptcy estate by invading the
rights of other juridic persons, which entities the Church vigorously
defends359 and which, in the final analysis, the First Amendment
forbids.360 Some people might agree that the plaintiffs' objective is
nonetheless a just one, but justice is a two-way street begging
consideration of the far-reaching consequences for Roman Catholics who
are wholly guiltless and unconnected to the sins of the sex-abuse scandal;
in the words of one Spokane parishioner, "'Do 90,000 innocent people
deserve to be punished for the sins of those few[?]'
361
354. See case cited supra note 118 (describing how widely applicable laws obviously do
not offend the First Amendment); cf supra text accompanying note 265 (indicating
plaintiffs' views of the applicability of tort laws to religious organizations in these
bankruptcy proceedings).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 340-343 (emphasizing the primacy of
bankruptcy principles and that tort victims' needs should not outweigh all other
considerations).
356. See Comm. of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Authorities in Response to
Oppositions and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 314, at 57 ("If this
Court were to find that the Diocese can unilaterally dictate the scope of its property
through canon law, and thereby reduce the likelihood victims will be compensated for
their injuries fairly, it would have turned the Bankruptcy Code into [sic] a haven for
criminals.").
357. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing Congressional and
fundamental bankruptcy goals).
358. See supra note 30; see also Nicholas K. Geranios, Judge Rules Diocese Can Sell
Property, COLUMBIAN, (Vancouver, Wash.), Aug. 27, 2005, at C2, 2005 WLNR 13545662
(quoting Bishop Skylstad's pledge to "'appeal [Judge Williams'] decision because we have
a responsibility, not only to victims, but to the generations of parishioners . . . who have
given so generously of themselves in order to build up the work of the Catholic Church in
Eastern Washington"'); Catholic Bishop of Spokane's Memorandum of Authorities in
Opposition to Tort Litigant Committee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra
note 210, at 47.
359. See supra Part I.C.
360. See supra Part II.B.
361. See Geranios, supra note 25 (quoting parishioner Robert Hailey).
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IV. CONCLUSION
A diocese organized as a corporation sole owns mere legal title to the
assets of its parishes, but that does not mean that these assets belong in
the bankruptcy estate of a diocese when it has filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. These assets are held in trust by the diocese for
its parishes in accordance with both statutory trusts and canon law.
Accordingly, courts should recognize this trust relationship to exclude
these assets from the bankruptcy estate under a provision that excludes
trust property. To disregard this relationship-to discriminate against
neutral, generally applicable laws-infringes the right to free exercise
enjoyed by dioceses and parishes. The recognition of this position hardly
involves a novel machination to avoid tort liability, but rather a
comprehensive and apposite understanding of state law, bankruptcy law,
and the First Amendment. This appreciation requires courts to conclude
that the assets of parishes are excludable from the bankruptcy estate of a
debtor-diocese, and to hold otherwise is unconstitutional.
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